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Procurement has emerged as a critical function, yet a challenging topic, since in
many firms procurement operations are complex, and laced with misaligned incen-
tives and information asymmetry between buyers and suppliers. Although economic
(auction) theory provides a basic foundation, the richness of the operational context
residing in supply chains offers numerous opportunities for research.
In my dissertation research, I focus on creating novel models to capture impor-
tant phenomena in sourcing that are under-studied and analytically challenging. In
particular, my thesis spans three different contexts that arise from a buyer’s lack of
information: (1) The role of cost modeling, (2) Consequence and remedies of having
an error in initial request for quotes (RFQ), and (3) The strategic use of an incumbent
supplier as an outside option when negotiating with entrant suppliers.
Essay 1: The role of cost modeling in competitive bid procurement
For firms who rely extensively on external suppliers for production, it is natural
to experience atrophying capabilities in manufacturing, as process engineers, produc-
tion technology experts, material experts, etc. are shed, which eventually leaves the
firms with little insight into current production trends and technologies. A firm who
lacks such information is at a disadvantage when buying from external suppliers, since
1
suppliers can earn outsized profits by exploiting the buyer’s lack of knowledge about
the true production cost. To mitigate this, many buyers engage in rigorous activi-
ties (known as cost modeling) seeking to estimate the minimum price a supplier is
willing to accept for a contract. These activities include sending experts to supplier
sites, gathering data, and engineering and process analysis, all of which are expensive
and time-consuming. However, in settings where the buyer plans to source through
competitive bidding, the benefit of cost modeling is not clear since the bidding com-
petition among suppliers can itself reveal cost information. This essay examines if,
how, and when cost modeling should be deployed. The value of cost modeling de-
pends on depth and breadth of the modeling, as well as on the amount of parity
(or disparity) that exists between the minimum prices suppliers are willing to accept
for the contract, information which the buyer does not have a priori. I show that
although bid competition sometimes duplicates the information gleaned by cost mod-
eling, the latter can still be beneficial when it helps the buyer set an effective reserve
price. I use stochastic ordering to characterize when and how the buyer gains the
most through cost modeling. Specifically, I characterize which supplier(s) to learn
about, which portion(s) of the costs to learn, and how deeply and broadly the buyer
should learn for general supply base topologies. I show that, when it comes to cost
modeling, approaches that rely on naive intuition and conventional wisdom about the
benefit of learning do not necessarily work. For instance, learning about the supplier
whose cost is the most uncertain is not necessarily optimal, nor is learning about the
cost portion that contributes most to the total cost. I also show that conventional
intuition that the benefit of additional information has a diminishing rate of return
does not apply. To the best of my knowledge, this essay is the first to model and
analyze how two very common procurement tools — cost modeling and competitive
bidding — interact. It has the potential to help procurement managers make better
decisions about how to apply cost modeling in practice.
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Essay 2: Procurement auctions with error-prone RFQs
While most procurement research assumes that the buyer’s RFQ is perfect as
given, in reality the RFQ can be flawed due to an error of omission and misspecifi-
cation. Moreover, experienced suppliers can be more knowledgeable than the buyer
and have the ability to, at the time of bidding, recognize such an error and anticipate
windfall profit consequent to it. This makes the buyer vulnerable to massively expen-
sive change orders during the life of the contract. For example, Northrop Grumman
is currently suing USPS for $180 million for imposing numerous change orders to the
contract for a mail sorting machine (Federal Times , 2012). I model the case in which
the buyer is prone to making an error in initial RFQ, which in turn may or may
not be detected by each supplier. I then ask how the buyer’s total cost is affected
by RFQ error and how this cost should be managed. I find that RFQ error encour-
ages suppliers to submit lower bids with anticipation of future windfall profit, and
suppliers’ disparity in their abilities to detect RFQ error generally hurts the buyer.
Furthermore, I propose a creative approach of “pre-pay” to stem windfall profit; in
this new mechanism, the buyer can use a nominal bounty to induce knowledgeable
suppliers to divulge the existence of RFQ error. To the best of my knowledge, this
essay is the first in operations to consider the practical case that the buyer’s RFQ
can be misspecified, as well as the fact that experienced suppliers can be more knowl-
edgeable than the buyer and the buyer can leverage suppliers’ knowledge. Analyzing
the problem is challenging, and I use a problem transformation method leveraging
optimal mechanism design to prove results about common auction formats like open-
bid descending and first-price sealed-bid auctions.
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Essay 3: Should the buyer strategically exclude the incumbent supplier
from the procurement auction?
In summer 2011, I interacted with a Tier-1 auto manufacturer who suspected
that they were paying too much to their incumbent supplier for a particular part,
and consequently they planned to hold an on-line auction with several entrant sup-
pliers. A primary concern of the procurement manager was whether the incumbent
supplier should be invited to the auction or not. On one hand, when withholding
the incumbent and using him as an outside option, the buyer can set an aggressive
reserve price for the entrant suppliers, but the auction itself is less fierce with one
fewer bidder. On the other hand, when including the incumbent in the auction, the
buyer drums up competition with one more bidder but is exposed to the risk of paying
more than current incumbent price. I model this situation and find that the buyer’s
optimal decision depends on the incumbent’s and entrants’ cost distributions: When
the incumbent’s cost is expected to be substantially different from the entrants’ (ei-
ther much lower or much higher) and has low uncertainty, withholding the incumbent
supplier is the better option; Conversely, when the incumbent’s cost is comparable to
the entrants’ costs and has similar amount of uncertainty, the buyer prefers inviting
the incumbent to the auction.
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CHAPTER 2
The Role of Cost Modeling in Competitive Bid
Procurement
2.1 Introduction
The average US manufacturer spends roughly 57% of its revenue on purchases
from external suppliers (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011). Procurement has
emerged as a critical function, particularly for manufacturers in highly competitive
industries. Seeking to manage their input costs, many such firms select external
suppliers via competitive bidding (reverse auctions). Ideally, competitive bidding
between potential suppliers drives the contract price to nearly the minimum the
winning supplier would be willing to accept, including of course a necessary operating
profit for the supplier. When this does not happen the buyer is leaving money on the
table.
Leaving money on the table is not likely a major concern if the buyer’s competi-
tive bidding event is for a highly standardized, non-critical good/service that is easy
to produce and for which it is relatively simple to qualify suppliers (e.g., paperclips).
But in practice buyers often auction off contracts for non-standardized items for which
supplier costs can be heterogeneous (e.g., driven by the supplier’s production technol-
ogy). Moreover, in addition to price, supplier qualification is a paramount concern to
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buyers. The process of locating and qualifying a supplier who is capable of producing
the needed good is typically very time-consuming. For example, at automotive and
electronics Fortune 500 manufacturers we interacted with, the supplier qualification
processes can take months, even for “commodity-type” goods like cables, connectors,
and screw machine parts. At these firms, functional areas such as engineering in-
vest considerable time and resources to verify supplier capabilities and approve the
supplier(s).
It is standard practice for buyers to invite only qualified suppliers to a competitive
bidding event and announce that the lowest bidding supplier will win the contract.
But due to the costly nature of supplier qualification (in terms of time, monetary costs
of testing, and political costs of imposing on the engineering department’s time) it is
common to have a relatively small supply pool. For example, at one manufacturer
we worked with many parts had just two suppliers who would be asked to bid. Un-
fortunately, a small supply pool can result in high prices for the buyer. As a buyer at
Pfizer put it (quoted by Atkinson (2008)) “In our online auctions, suppliers can see
what each other bids. If they were willing to go much lower, but none of the other
participants forced them to do so, [the buyer] can lose out.”
How are buyers attempting to avoid leaving money on the table while still ensuring
that they only deal with qualified suppliers? A very common approach in practice is
the use of a reserve price. A reserve price is the price at which the buyer opens the
bidding — it is the maximum amount the buyer is willing to pay for the contract.
Setting the reserve price is important because the closer it is to the eventual winner’s
minimum price, the less money the buyer will leave on the table. As the practitioner
survey Beall et al. (2003) points out (page 44), a critical issue when procuring an item
is “understanding the unique characteristics of the item’s supply market structure,
degree of competitiveness, key cost drivers, and current open capacity (i.e., is it a
buyer’s, suppliers’, or neutral market?). This information is essential for setting an
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appropriately aggressive reserve price.”
To set a more informed reserve price, it is a growing trend for buyers to actively
engage in gathering market intelligence about suppliers. At an electronics firm we
worked with, a procurement department employee with a background in corporate
finance spent an enormous amount of time combing through information about the
supply pool. Using any data he could find (like financial statements) the employee
formed an understanding the supplier’s financial status, what their operating profits
were (if they were publicly listed), etc. Procurement managers at the firm would also
perform reconnaissance on the ground, by visiting suppliers and gauging the sup-
plier’s capacity utilization (for example, seeing if they could spot a recently installed
new production line that was under-utilized). Similarly, at an automotive firm we
worked with, two employees were allocated for more than one month to painstakingly
collect cost information about an auto part being procured. They tracked down a
production engineer formerly employed at the firm’s now shuttered internal plant to
learn how the part had been made. They also interviewed industry experts to learn
about current manufacturing practices, scoured reports on prevailing labor and util-
ity costs, gathered, cleaned and analyzed data, etc. In industry these activities are
often referred to as cost modeling, however what is actually being estimated is the
minimum price at which the supplier is wiling to accept the contract.
Although a small qualified supply pool is one good reason to set an informed
reserve price, even with a large supply pool money can still be left on the table
due to supplier collusion. In fact, at the automotive firm we dealt with, this was
an additional concern. Several potential suppliers submitting bids were co-located
within a few hours’ drive of each other in Asia. The buyer knew that the suppliers
were in close contact with one another. The buyer was concerned about collusion,
which would dampen bidding competition and make it less effective. In this case,
the buyer decided to invest time and energy to create cost models to help her obtain
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price concessions.
Cost modeling is expensive as it involves skilled employees’ time and travel. It
should only be used when the firm is confident that it will get its money’s worth out
of the exercise. In this essay we explore the value of cost modeling in competitive bid
procurement, to understand if, how and when cost modeling should be deployed. The
answer is not obvious, since the bidding competition itself acts as a tool to discover
suppliers’ cost information — suppliers may have to bid close to their minimum
acceptable prices in order to win the competitive bid. The value of cost modeling
depends on the amount of parity (or disparity) that exists between the minimum
prices suppliers are willing to accept for the contract, information which the buyer
does not have a priori.
We examine a buyer who, after deciding to source (e.g., after winning a new pro-
duction contract from a downstream customer), needs to select an upstream supplier
in a timely fashion to allow adequate ramp-up time to avoid production delays. Since
cost models take many weeks or possibly months to develop, we take the perspective
of a buyer who, at the beginning of a bidding cycle, must decide which supplier(s) to
learn about, which portion(s) of their costs to learn, and how deeply to learn. More
specifically, we investigate the following research questions:
Research Question 1: How does one characterize the benefit of cost modeling? Is
cost modeling beneficial to the buyer even when suppliers compete?
Research Question 2: If the buyer chooses to develop a cost model, which sup-
plier(s) should the buyer learn about?
Research Question 3: If the buyer can choose to learn about various portions of
the cost, e.g., labor cost, input cost, packaging cost, etc., which portion(s)
should the buyer learn about?
Research Question 4: If the buyer chooses to develop a cost model, how deeply
into supplier(s)’ costs should she learn? Would the buyer ever want to learn
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about multiple competing suppliers?
Research Question 5: How do answers to the above questions depend on underly-
ing business characteristics, such as correlations across suppliers’ costs, and
supplier collusion?
Answers to these research questions are summarized in §2.9. We review related
literature in §2.2, and introduce the model in §2.3. Sections 2.4 and 2.5 study the
two-supplier and N -supplier cases, respectively. We extend our analysis to include
the cost of learning and provide an optimal learning strategy incorporating it in §2.6.
Section 2.7 studies correlations across suppliers’ costs and collusion among suppliers.
Section 2.8 compares the benefit of learning to the benefit of adding suppliers, and
examines how the buyer’s power in the supply chain affects the benefit of learning.
Proofs of results are furnished in §2.10.
2.2 Literature Review
There is a vast economics literature on competitive bidding (auctions). Krishna
(2009) provides an excellent introduction to the early literature. There is a grow-
ing literature on procurement auctions, examining various operational aspects such
as the need to consider quality as well as price (Che, 1993; Beil and Wein, 2003;
Kostamis et al., 2009), the need to perform costly supplier qualification screening
(Wan and Beil , 2009; Wan et al., 2012), auctions with quantity-flexible pricing
(Chen, 2007; Duenyas et al., 2013; Tunca and Wu, 2009), post-award audits and
profit-sharing (Chen et al., 2008), supplier capacity decisions (Li , 2013), unreliable
suppliers (Chaturvedi et al., 2011), double auctions (Chu, 2009), and large-scale com-
binatorial auctions (Olivares et al., 2012). However, none of these papers study cost
modeling prior to competitive bidding, which is the focus of our paper.
A number of papers apply econometric analyses on historical bid data to estimate
bidders’ private information. For example, Paarsch (1997) uses historical auction
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field data to derive an estimate of the optimal reserve price in English auctions for
government timber sales (see the recent text by Paarsch and Hong (2006) for more
examples). In contrast to these papers, we take the buyer’s prior beliefs about suppli-
ers’ costs as our point of departure. We examine how the buyer can deploy a totally
different approach to refine her prior information, namely creating a cost model to
derive suppliers’ costs using a bottom-up approach. The main aim of our paper is
to examine if the buyer should engage in the time-consuming cost modeling prior to
competitive bidding, and how and to what extent the buyer should deploy it. To our
knowledge, ours is the first paper in the literature to examine cost modeling in this
context.
A practitioner literature exists on how to construct cost models. For example,
chapter 3 in Laseter (1998) describes various ways that buyers can decompose a sup-
plier’s cost into a number of cost drivers, each of which can then be estimated through
various means of data collection, as well as the challenges of doing so. One way of
gathering data about suppliers firsthand is Rapid Plant Assessment; Goodson (2002)
describes how this careful approach to factory tours allows a trained team of procure-
ment specialists to estimate a plant’s cost of sales based on key observations made
while touring the plant. There is also a literature on using cost modeling to inform
new product development decisions where the designer must balance functionality
against cost (see Locascio (2000) and references therein).
2.3 Model Description and Preliminaries
We consider a buyer seeking to allocate a single, indivisible production contract
to a supplier. We assume the buyer can set a reserve price, which she uses to help
avoid leaving money on the table. This setup reflects industry practice; see the quote
from the practitioner survey Beall et al. (2003) in the Introduction, which discusses
the fact Fortune 500 companies in practice use reserve prices informed by what they
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know about the supply market.
Our model also captures the fact that, when setting a reserve price, the buyer must
be careful. As Beall et al. (2003) points out (page 9), “misreading the market and
setting a reserve price that is too far below the market price, resulting in no bidder
responses” is considered a “dysfunctional outcome” of an auction. To understand
why practitioners are loathe to set a reserve price that no bidder can meet, consider
the following: If the reserve price is not met, the buyer has to exclude the original
bidders from further consideration. (If suppliers believe that the buyer will increase
the reserve price and re-invite them to bid if the original reserve price is not met,
then no supplier would ever bid in an auction with a reserve price.) The buyer is
then faced with the prospect of: (i) forgoing the business altogether and abandoning
the purchase; (ii) turning to its own internal production facilities; or (iii) finding new
qualified suppliers to offer the business to. In reality, forgoing the business is often not
palatable — for example, an electronics firm is unlikely to discontinue its production
of laptops simply because it could not strike a deal in an auction for the needed USB
connectors. Turning to internal production facilities is also often not available — for
example, the electronics and automotive parts manufacturers we dealt with did not
have internal production facilities for many of the parts they needed.
This leaves the last option, finding new suppliers. With this option, the procure-
ment manager faces many challenges. First, because the procurement manager’s job
is striking a deal with a supplier (not vetting suppliers’ technical qualifications), she
has to turn to her internal customers (e.g., manufacturing and engineering) and ask
the internal customers to help qualify additional suppliers, due to the fact that the
suppliers that the internal customers had originally qualified were eliminated from
further consideration because she set a reserve price so low that it was below all the
suppliers’ true costs. Understandably, internal customers would not necessarily react
well to this imposition on their time and work which the procurement manager’s ac-
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tions had caused. Moreover, due to the time required to identify and qualify a new
supplier, finding qualified new suppliers in time may not even be feasible within a
procurement cycle (e.g,. some parts may require very time-consuming testing).
To reflect the above aspects of reality, in our model we capture the realistic sit-
uation that non-transaction is extremely costly for the buyer. Namely, we model a
buyer who wishes to avoid non-transaction, but still use a reserve price that avoids
(to the extent possible) leaving money on the table. To present our model and build
intuition, we first examine a setting where the buyer has a single supplier.
2.3.1 One supplier
Let c denote the minimum price the supplier would accept for the contract. Fol-
lowing auction theoretic convention we simply refer to c as the supplier’s “cost”,
which of course is the supplier’s private information. The value c is a realization of
random variable C drawn from a continuous distribution H. We assume that C is
bounded above by c̄. The buyer can employ a reserve price, r, as a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to the supplier, and a supplier will accept this offer if this price can cover his
production cost, i.e., r ≥ c.
Since the buyer wishes to avoid non-transaction, but still use a reserve price that
avoids (to the extent possible) leaving money on the table, the best reserve price the
buyer can offer is ro = c̄. This reserve price leaves the supplier a sizeable windfall if the
upper bound c̄ is well above the supplier’s true cost c. As mentioned in §2.1, to get a
better estimate of the supplier’s cost the buyer can build a cost model and collect data
on the supplier before deciding her reserve price. For instance, for a manufactured
good, a buyer might decompose the supplier’s production cost into the sum of several
attributes — such as raw material cost, direct labor cost, electricity cost, technology
cost, overhead cost, and minimum acceptable profit margin — and learn some of
these attribute costs through data collection. For example, a buyer can contact raw
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material providers to learn the cost of material that a supplier uses, estimate labor
cost using local labor cost reports, or send specialists to visit a supplier’s plant to
learn the type of machines used and hence the technology cost. Of course, not all
attributes can be learned; for example, overhead cost is usually difficult to learn.
To model this, we assume that the supplier’s cost C can be decomposed into two
portions: A, the portion of cost attributes that can be learned via cost modeling,
and X, the portion that cannot be learned. We assume that A follows a continuous
distribution F and is bounded above by ā, X follows a continuous distribution G
and is bounded above by x̄. As such, the supplier’s cost C’s distribution H is the
convolution of F and G (H = F ⊗G) and the upper bound of C satisfies c̄ = ā+ x̄.
Let a and x denote the realizations of A and X, respectively.
After learning the supplier’s portion, A = a, the buyer can update her knowledge
about the supplier’s cost: [C|(A = a)] = a + X. This random variable C|(A = a)













= a + x̄, which is the new contract payment. The
benefit of learning is the difference in the contract payment without learning and with
learning, denoted by ψ:
ψ = ro − rl = c̄− (A+ x̄) = ā− A.
Obviously, learning brings the buyer a positive benefit, as the following shows:
Lemma 2.1. If the buyer’s supply base has only one supplier, P (ψ > 0) = 1 and
E[ψ] = ā− E[A].
2.3.2 Two suppliers
Now we consider the case when the buyer has two suppliers. It is less clear whether
learning about the supplier(s)’ cost information can bring the buyer a positive benefit,
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because competition between suppliers itself acts as a cost-discovery tool.
To explore this interplay, we assume the two suppliers’ costs, C1 and C2, are inde-
pendent (we extend our analysis to correlated costs in §2.7.1) and follow distributions
H1 and H2 with upper bounds c̄1 and c̄2, respectively. The buyer first sets a reserve
price r as a starting point and then asks the suppliers to give price offers at or below
price r. The buyer can play the suppliers’ offers against one another by treating
the current lowest offer as the winner unless this offer is unseated by a lower offer
from the other supplier. As we have observed in industries ranging from electronics
to automotive parts, such competitive bid processes are often administered via an
online platform where the bidding takes place over a short period of time (e.g., 30
minutes). The ensuing process drives down the contract price until it becomes so
low that only one supplier (the contract winner) remains. This competitive process
can be modeled as a reverse open-descending auction for the contract, for which the
dominant strategy for a bidder is to continue bidding until reaching their true cost or
winning the auction. The predicted equilibrium outcome is as follows: The lower-cost
supplier wins the contract at a price equalling the cost of the other supplier. The
reserve price set by the buyer, r, acts as a price ceiling; hence, the buyer’s contract
payment with two suppliers is π = min(r,max(C1, C2)).
The buyer must transact with one of the suppliers qualified to produce the good,
but seeks to set a reserve price that minimizes her expected contracting payment:
min
r
E[π] s.t. P (min(C1, C2) ≤ r) = 1.
The solution of the above problem, and the buyer’s contracting payment are, respec-
tively:
ro = min(c̄1, c̄2), and π
o = min(ro,max(C1, C2)).
Notice that ro is the lowest reserve price that can avoid the risk of non-transaction
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since the supplier with the lower upper bound can generate non-negative surplus and
will surely be interested in the contract.
Similar to the one-supplier case, the buyer can create cost models to better esti-
mate the suppliers’ costs. For supplier i = 1, 2, we let random variable Ai denote the
learnable portion, with distribution Fi whose domain is bounded above by āi. Like-
wise, letXi ∼ Gi denote the unlearnable portion, which is bounded above by x̄i. After
learning supplier i’s portion Ai = ai, the buyer can update her knowledge of supplier





Hence, if the buyer learns about a subset of suppliers S (S can be {1}, {2}, or {1, 2}),
the buyer can set a new reserve price:
rl = min
i∈S,j /∈S
(c̄li, c̄j) = min
i∈S,j /∈S
(Ai + x̄i, c̄j).
Accordingly, the buyer’s contract payment after learning is:
πl = min(rl,max(C1, C2)).
The benefit of learning is:
ψ = πo − πl. (2.1)
Unlike the one-supplier case, when there exists competition between suppliers,
learning does not always bring a positive benefit for the buyer.
Lemma 2.2. If there are two competing suppliers and one supplier’s cost is not
dominated by the other supplier’s cost (i.e., 0 < P (C1 > C2) < 1), then with strictly
positive probability learning brings no benefit at all (i.e., P (ψ = 0) > 0).
To understand the reason why competition between the two suppliers can make
learning redundant, suppose the buyer learns about just one of the two suppliers.
Competition will automatically identify the lower-cost supplier as the contract winner
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and can push the price down to the cost of the other supplier, so a good reserve price
needs to be set close to the winner’s true cost (or the minimum price the winner
would accept) so that the buyer can squeeze the winner’s surplus. Simply setting
a lower reserve price does not guarantee it will be effective. Indeed, the buyer may
be able to set a new, lowered reserve price even when the supplier she learns about
eventually loses. However, in this case, the new reserve price is never low enough to
affect the final payment. Even if the buyer learns about the contract winner, learning
can again be useless since if the new reserve price is not low enough it will not bind the
payment. It should be noted that learning results in a positive benefit to the buyer
only when the buyer learns about the contract winner and can set a new reserve price
low enough to be the new contract payment.
However, this makes the buyer’s problem difficult since suppliers’ true costs are
their private information and the buyer can not ex ante predict with certainty who
will be the contract winner or how close the suppliers’ costs will be. In the next
section, we will discuss when to learn and how to learn so as to get the maximum
expected benefit. We define the expected benefit of learning as Ψ = E[ψ]. In this
paper, the sample path value, ψ, and its expectation, Ψ, will be subscripted to denote
which supplier(s) are learned about.
Thus far we have introduced the expected benefit of learning, which we analyze in
Sections 2.4 and 2.5. The models in these sections do not consider the cost of learning.
Of course, cost modeling is time-consuming and expensive as the buyer may need
to visit the supplier’s site, interview industry experts, analyze industry reports and
forecasts, etc. Practitioners need to consider the tradeoff between the expense and
the benefit of cost modeling. Building on our base model analyses, we incorporate
the cost of learning in §2.6. Sections 2.7 and 2.8 offer further generalizations and
extensions.
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2.4 Analysis – Two Suppliers
We now answer our research questions when the buyer has two competing suppli-
ers. We allow the possibility that the two suppliers are heterogeneous. For example,
the cost structure of a supplier using labor-intensive production processes will differ
from that of a supplier whose production is highly automated. Suppliers located in
different regions may have different energy and shipping cost structures. In these
cases, cost models are supplier-specific and a single cost model is developed to esti-
mate the cost information of one supplier. Without loss of generality, we consider
learning about supplier 1’s learnable portion A1, and let Ψ1 denote the expected
benefit of learning.
We also allow the other possibility, namely the two suppliers are homogeneous.
In such cases, the suppliers can have different cost realizations but both share the
same cost distributions, i.e., C1, C2 follow H with upper bound c̄, A1, A2 follow F
with upper bound ā and X1, X2 follow G with upper bound x̄. For example, the
suppliers could have similar, labor-intensive production processes, so one cost model
can be used for both suppliers. Of course, even if they share the same cost drivers
(e.g., labor) the suppliers’ costs can be different (due to differences in exact minutes
of direct labor per unit, suppliers’ labor wage rates, or fringe benefits for employees).
Let Ψ1&2 denote the expected benefit of learning about portion A of both suppliers.
The following result characterizes the benefit of cost modeling prior to competitive
bidding. This result and Lemma 2.2 characterize the benefit of learning and therefore
answer research question 1.
Proposition 2.1. [Relation between learning and cost distributions]
(i) When the two suppliers are heterogeneous, the expected benefit of learning A1 is
Ψ1 = E[min(ā1 − A1, (C2 − (A1 + x̄1))+)]. (2.2)
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As long as the domains of F1 and G1 do not change,
(a) Ψ1 decreases as F1 becomes stochastically larger;
(b) Ψ1 is independent of G1;
(c) Ψ1 increases as H2 becomes stochastically larger.
(ii) When the two suppliers are homogeneous, the expected benefit of learning A1 and
A2 is
Ψ1&2 = E[(max(C1, C2)− (min(A1, A2) + x̄))+].
As long as the domains of F and G do not change,
(a) Ψ1&2 is not necessarily monotonic as F becomes stochastically larger;
(b) Ψ1&2 increases as G becomes stochastically larger.
Proposition 2.1 shows that the benefit of learning depends on the suppliers’ cost
distributions in interesting ways. Consider the case in which the buyer builds a cost
model for a single supplier in a heterogeneous supply base. As the distribution of the
learnable portion, F1, becomes stochastically larger, the benefit of learning decreases,
as shown in part (i.a). This is intuitive because the new reserve price (which will
stochastically increase in F1) is less likely to bind the contract payment. Likewise,
the benefit grows as the cost distribution of supplier 1’s opponent whom we do not
learn about increases, explaining part (i.c). However, part (i.b) implies that the
expected benefit of learning is independent of the distribution that governs supplier
1’s unlearnable cost, G1. This is because after learning, the new reserve price, a1+ x̄1,
depends on G1 only through its upper bound.
Next, consider the case where the buyer creates a cost model that applies to both
suppliers in the supply base. Interestingly, the results for this case differ from what
we saw above. As the learnable cost decreases, the reserve price, min(A1, A2) + x̄,
decreases as well. But at the same time, the cost the buyer would have paid without
learning, max(C1, C2), also decreases. As a result, the benefit of learning — the
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difference between these two — does not necessarily grow or shrink, as stated in
part (ii.a). Moreover, part (ii.b) shows that the benefit of learning increases as the
unlearnable portion becomes stochastically larger. This is because the cost the buyer
would have paid without learning increases, but the reserve price remains unchanged.
2.4.1 Which supplier(s) should the buyer learn about?
For the heterogeneous suppliers case in the previous section, we assumed that
the buyer learned about supplier 1. However, would the buyer have been better off
learning instead about supplier 2? To help answer this, we need to compare the
expected benefit of learning either supplier. We now examine this issue, addressing
research question 2.
Intuitively, one may expect that the buyer wishes to resolve the maximal amount
of cost uncertainty and so she will optimally choose whichever supplier has the most
uncertain learnable cost. This logic is true when the buyer has only one supplier in
her supply base. Suppose supplier 1’s learnable cost A1 ∼ U [5, 10] and unlearnable
cost X1 ∼ U [0, 5], while supplier 2’s cost A2 ∼ U [0, 10] and X2 ∼ U [10, 11]. Were
the buyer facing a single-supplier situation with supplier 1, learning would bring an
expected benefit of ā1−E[A1] = 2.5 (Lemma 2.1). This is smaller than ā2−E[A2] = 5,
which would be her expected benefit from learning if supplier 2 was her only supplier.
The intuition in the single-supplier case is that the buyer would gain more benefit
from learning when the learnable portion has more uncertainty.
However, this result is no longer true when the buyer has two competing suppliers.
The benefit of learning does not solely depend on the Ai’s. In fact, in the example
above, learning about supplier 1 brings a much larger benefit (per equation (2.1),
Ψ1 = 1.79 > 0.04 = Ψ2). Competition is what differentiates the one-supplier and
two-supplier cases. Competition itself works as a cost-discovery tool, so learning
brings a positive benefit only when it collects information that cannot be duplicated
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by competition. More precisely, the buyer needs information about the contract
winner’s cost that helps the buyer to set an effective new reserve price. In this
example, supplier 1’s cost C1 is stochastically smaller than supplier 2’s cost C2; this
means that supplier 1 has a better chance of winning the contract. In addition, the
new reserve price set by learning about supplier 1 (i.e., A1 + x̄1) is more likely to be
smaller than that for supplier 2 (i.e., A2 + x̄2). As a result, learning about supplier 1
is more beneficial. Our result below formalizes.
Proposition 2.2. [Preferred supplier to learn about] For any distributions Fi, Gi and
Hi, i = 1, 2, the buyer prefers to learn about supplier 1 rather than supplier 2 if
A1 + x̄1 ≤st A2 + x̄2 and C1 ≤st C2.
It should be noted that both conditions in Proposition 2.2 are necessary to draw
the conclusion. Even if learning is likely to dramatically reduce the reserve price, it
will be useless if it does not bind the contract payment to the contract winner.
Instead of learning about just one supplier, the buyer could instead choose to un-
dertake learning about both suppliers. If suppliers are homogeneous, the buyer can
create a single cost model that applies to both suppliers. If suppliers are heteroge-
neous, the buyer needs to develop two different cost models concurrently. Since cost
models take several months to develop, in most cases, it is not feasible to conduct
multiple rounds of learning in a single bidding cycle. Thus, decisions on whom to
learn about should be made judiciously at the beginning.
Utilizing the same machinery, our next result characterizes the benefit of learning
about multiple suppliers. One may intuitively reason that the marginal benefit of
learning will diminish in the number of suppliers that the buyer learns about — after
all, the buyer ultimately only sets one new reserve price which applies to all suppliers,
thus more learning will likely just generate duplicative information. In other words,
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the benefit of learning about two suppliers should be smaller than the sum of the
benefits of learning about either supplier individually. Surprisingly, the next result
shows that this is not the case: The benefit is actually additive.
Proposition 2.3. [Benefit of learning about multiple suppliers]
(i) For two heterogeneous suppliers, ψ1&2 = ψ1 + ψ2 almost surely; hence Ψ1&2 =
Ψ1 +Ψ2.
(ii) For two homogeneous suppliers, Ψ1&2 = 2 ·Ψ1.
To understand the intuition behind Proposition 2.3, recall that the buyer realizes
a benefit from learning only if she learns about the contract winner. For a given
sample path, at most one supplier can yield a positive benefit, i.e., ψ1&2 = ψ1, ψ2 = 0
or ψ1&2 = ψ2, ψ1 = 0, which explains part (i). Part (ii) follows from part (i) and the
fact that the two suppliers have the same cost distributions.
2.4.2 Which portion(s) of cost should the buyer learn?
Another interesting challenge for the buyer is to determine which portion(s) of the
suppliers’ costs she should learn. To address this question, in this section we assume
that portions Ai and Xi are both learnable. Note that this setup is without loss of
generality: our results still hold when supplier i’s cost is Ci = Ai +Xi + ϵi, where ϵi
is unlearnable. To address research question 3, we first ask which portion, if learned,
would bring more benefit to the buyer.
Suppose two cost portions, labor and utility, comprise roughly 50% and 20% of
the total cost, respectively. Intuitively, one might expect that the buyer would prefer
to learn the labor cost, since it represents a larger share of the total cost. However,
this intuition does not tell the whole story. What is more important for the buyer to
consider is the amount of cost uncertainty which will be resolved by learning, not the
absolute magnitude of the cost. This is the intuition behind the following proposition.
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Proposition 2.4. [Preferred portion to learn]
(i) When the two suppliers are heterogeneous, for any distributions Fi, Gi and Hi,
i = 1, 2, the buyer prefers to learn portion A1 rather than portion X1 if
ā1 − A1 ≥st x̄1 −X1.
(ii) When the two suppliers are homogeneous and the buyer learns about one portion
of both suppliers, then for any distributions F,G and H, the buyer prefers to learn
portion A rather than portion X if
ā− A ≥st x̄−X.
Thus, it is not the case that the buyer only wishes to learn whichever portion
contributes most to the supplier’s overall total cost. Instead, Proposition 2.4 reveals
that the buyer prefers to learn whichever portion will reduce the reserve price the
most.
Having discussed which portion (A or X) the buyer should learn, we now address
research question 4 by considering how deep the buyer should learn, that is, the
buyer’s preference between learning one portion (A or X) or both portions (A and
X). To examine the buyer’s preference, suppose again that the two cost portions are
labor and utilities. The buyer’s expected benefit is $10,000 from learning only the
labor cost, and her expected benefit is $17,000 from learning only the utility cost.
Intuitively, one might expect that “doubling down” on the supplier by learning the
supplier’s labor and utility costs would yield an expected benefit less than the sum of
the individual benefits (i.e., the expected benefit should be smaller than $27,000)—
after all, there is a chance that supplier 1 will not win the contract and then learning
will be useless. However, the following result shows that, when it comes to the depth
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of learning, the benefit of learning the whole is greater than the sum of the benefits
of learning its parts (superadditivity).
Proposition 2.5. [Benefit of learning multiple portions] Consider three cost-learning
models: Model A in which the buyer learns about portion A, Model X in which the
buyer learns about portion X, and Model AX in which the buyer learns about both
portions (A and X) simultaneously.
(i) When the two suppliers are heterogeneous and cost modeling is applied only to
supplier 1, we have ψAX1 ≥ ψA1 + ψX1 almost surely; hence ΨAX1 ≥ ΨA1 +ΨX1 .
(ii) When the two suppliers are homogeneous and the same cost model can be applied
to both suppliers, we have ψAX ≥ ψA + ψX almost surely; hence ΨAX ≥ ΨA +ΨX .
Both competition and cost modeling are tools that the buyer can use to reduce
the winning supplier’s surplus. Our earlier results establish that cost modeling prior
to competition is only beneficial when the new reserve price squeezes the winning
supplier’s surplus more than competition alone would have. In other words, to yield a
positive benefit, the new reserve price must be lower than the second-lowest supplier’s
cost. The new reserve price is much more likely to accomplish this if two cost portions
are learned instead of just one, because the reserve price reduction is cumulative in
cost portions learned. To use a golf analogy, when the buyer only learns one portion,
she has to “hit a hole-in-one” but when she learns two portions she only needs to
hit a hole in two strokes; the proposition means that hitting a hole-in-one in two
attempts is much less likely to occur than hitting a hole in two strokes. Combining
Propositions 2.3 and 2.5, the takeaway for procurement managers is that, all else
equal, depth in cost modeling is likely to be more beneficial than breadth.
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2.5 More than Two Suppliers
We now generalize our results to the case of N > 2 suppliers. Some of the N
suppliers may share the same cost drivers (i.e., are homogeneous), in which case the
buyer can learn about those suppliers simultaneously by developing a cost model
that applies to all of them. We also allow supplier heterogeneity, meaning that not
all N suppliers have the same cost structure. Formally, we divide the N suppliers
into S groups, where group s (s = 1, 2, ..., S) contains Ns homogeneous suppliers
whose cost is represented by random variable Cs = As +Xs. As in the two-supplier
case, random variables Cs, As, and Xs respectively follow distributions Hs, Fs, and
Gs, whose domains are bounded above by c̄s, ās and x̄s. When referring to the cost





Suppliers in the same group are homogeneous and suppliers in different groups are
heterogeneous. For example, suppose the buyer has a total of eight suppliers: five
are located in northeastern China and use very similar labor-intensive production
techniques; three are located in the midwestern US and all these suppliers utilize
very similar automated production lines. We can divide the eight suppliers into two
separate groups: group 1 has five suppliers in China and group 2 has three suppliers
in the US.
We find that all of §2.4’s propositions for the two-supplier case can be generalized:
Suppliers across different groups are heterogeneous (analogous to part (i) of the two-
supplier propositions) and suppliers within a group are homogeneous (analogous to
part (ii) of the two-supplier propositions). Building on the two-supplier case results,
we find that the buyer follows similar strategies when deciding which group(s) of
suppliers to learn about and which portion(s) of cost to learn. To denote the N -
supplier generalizations of earlier propositions, we append their label with “G” for
general.
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Characterizing the benefit of cost modeling. Addressing research question 1,
Lemma 2.2 directly applies to the N -supplier case, and shows that learning might
not be beneficial due to the fact that learning and competition can act as substitutes.
Moreover, we extend Proposition 2.1:
Proposition. 2.1-G. [Relation between learning and cost distributions] Let Ψ1 de-
note the expected benefit of learning all suppliers in group 1. As long as the domains
of F1 and G1 do not change,
(i) when group 1 has only one supplier, i.e., N1 = 1,
(a) Ψ1 decreases as F1 becomes stochastically larger;
(b) Ψ1 is independent of G1;
(c) Ψ1 increases as Hs (s ̸= 1) becomes stochastically larger;
(ii) when group 1 has more than one supplier, i.e., N1 ≥ 2,
(a) Ψ1 is not necessarily monotonic as F1 becomes stochastically larger;
(b) Ψ1 increases as G1 becomes stochastically larger;
(c) Ψ1 increases as Hs (s ̸= 1) becomes stochastically larger.
The intuition is similar to that for Proposition 2.1. Learning about group 1
brings a positive benefit only when group 1 contains the winner. Furthermore, when
learning does bring a positive benefit, the benefit’s magnitude is governed by the gap
between the reserve price (which is determined by F1 and the domain of X1) and the
second-lowest supplier’s cost (determined by all the non-winning suppliers’ costs).
For example, the benefit of learning is not affected by G1 when there is one supplier
in group 1 (i.b), but is affected when there are two suppliers in group 1 (ii.b). This
is because when group 1 contains the winner, the second-lowest supplier’s cost does
not change in the former case but depends on G1 in the latter case.
Choosing which group(s) of suppliers to learn about. Addressing research
question 2, we have:
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Proposition. 2.2-G. [Preferred group to learn about] For any distributions Fs, Gs
and Hs, s = 1, 2, ..., S, the buyer prefers to learn about group 1 rather than group 2 if
A1 + x̄1 ≤st A2 + x̄2, C1 ≤st C2 and N1 ≥ N2.
Compared to Proposition 2.2, in Proposition 2.2-G we have an additional condi-
tion, N1 ≥ N2. The intuition is similar to that for Proposition 2.2. As before, the
buyer’s preference about which group to learn about depends on how low the new
reserve price can be and how likely it is that a supplier in the group will win the con-
tract. Both factors improve as the group’s size increases: Larger groups offer a bigger
chance to set a small reserve price and are more likely to contain the contract winner.
The next result characterizes how the breadth of learning across groups affects the
buyer’s benefit.
Proposition. 2.3-G. [Benefit of learning about multiple groups] Let Ψ1&2, Ψs, and
Ψis denote, respectively, the expected benefits of learning about all suppliers in groups 1
and 2, all suppliers in group s, and supplier i in group s. We have:
(i) ψ1&2 = ψ1 + ψ2 almost surely; hence Ψ1&2 = Ψ1 +Ψ2.
(ii) Ψs = Ns ·Ψis.
One may reason that, particularly with N suppliers, the expected marginal benefit
of learning will diminish in the number of groups that the buyer learns about —
after all, the buyer ultimately only sets one new reserve price which applies to all N
suppliers. However, the expected benefit of learning multiple groups is in fact additive
across groups and linear in the number of learned suppliers within each group. The
intuition behind this is the same as for Proposition 2.3: Along any sample path only
one supplier wins the contract, and the buyer only benefits when she learns about
the winner.
Choosing which portion(s) of cost to learn and how deeply to learn. Ad-
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dressing research questions 3 and 4, we have:
Proposition. 2.4-G. [Preferred portion to learn] Suppose the buyer learns about all
suppliers in group 1. For any distributions Fs, Gs and Hs, s = 1, 2, ..., S, the buyer
prefers to learn portion A1 rather than portion X1 if
ā1 − A1 ≥st x̄1 −X1.
The proposition reveals that what matters to the buyer is the amount of cost
uncertainty that learning will resolve: She prefers to learn about whichever portion
will (stochastically) reduce the reserve price the most. The takeaway is similar to what
we found with two suppliers, namely it is not the case that the buyer only wishes
to learn about whichever cost portion contributes most to the suppliers’ overall total
costs. Next we examine how the benefit changes in depth of learning.
Proposition. 2.5-G. [Benefit of learning multiple portions] Let ΨA1 , Ψ
X
1 , and Ψ
AX
1
denote, respectively, the expected benefits when cost modeling is applied to portion A,
portion X, and both portions A and X for all suppliers in group 1. We have
ψAX1 ≥ ψA1 + ψX1 almost surely; hence ΨAX1 ≥ ΨA1 +ΨX1 .
The intuition is akin to that for Proposition 2.5: To be effective the reserve price
must bind the winner, and this is particularly encouraged by deeper learning because
reserve price reductions are cumulative in cost portions learned. Combining this result
with Proposition 2.3-G, which shows that the benefit across groups is linear, we can
see that, all else equal, the buyer gets greater benefit from learning a single group in
more depth than she does by learning two groups more superficially.
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2.6 Optimal Learning Strategy
The previous sections characterized the buyer’s benefit of learning without explic-
itly considering the cost of learning. However, as established earlier, cost modeling is
time-consuming and expensive. If we consider the cost of learning, should the buyer
learn at all? If so, which suppliers should the buyer learn about, and how deep into
suppliers’ costs should the buyer learn when deeper learning incurs higher cost? The
buyer’s cost of learning can depend on which suppliers she learns about, how many
suppliers she learns about, and how deeply she learns about them; we will show how
the previous sections’ analytical results can directly be applied in all these cases to
provide insight on the structure of the buyer’s optimal learning.
Learning cost is fixed for all suppliers in the same group. To begin, suppose
there is simply a fixed cost Ks to create a cost model for each supplier group s. Recall
that Ψs is the expected benefit of learning about group s without considering the cost
of learning. Thus, the net benefit of learning about group s is Ψs − Ks. Label the
groups such that Ψ1 −K1 ≥ Ψ2 −K2 ≥ · · · ≥ ΨS −KS. If the buyer can learn about
just one group, it is optimal to learn about group 1 (provided that Ψ1 −K1 > 0). If
the buyer can learn about multiple groups, it is optimal for her to learn about the
first s groups, where s is largest value such that Ψs−Ks > 0. In fact, although it may
seem intractable to consider the buyer’s cost versus benefit of learning while taking
into account the possibility that she learns from multiple cost models at once, the
problem in fact decomposes and can be solved by considering each supplier group in
isolation. This is a direct consequence of Proposition 2.3-G(i), which proves that the
benefit of learning is additive across groups.
Learning cost increases in the number of suppliers learned. Next suppose
that there is a cost associated with the number of suppliers learned in any group s,
Ks(n). Let Ψs(n) be the expected benefit of learning about n suppliers in group s.
28
Putting these two together, the net benefit of learning is Ψs(n)−Ks(n).
If the cost function Ks(n) is concave in n, Proposition 2.3-G(ii) directly applies
to prove that the optimal number of suppliers to learn about must be n∗s = 0 or
Ns. This comes from the fact that the benefit of learning is linear in the number of
suppliers learned, which makes the net benefit function convex in n. On the other
hand, if Ks(n) is convex, Proposition 2.3-G(ii) directly applies to prove that the net
benefit function, Ψs(n) − Ks(n), is concave in n. Hence, one can easily determine
the optimal number of suppliers to learn about. For general increasing functions, the
optimal number of suppliers to learn about depends on the particular shape of the
cost function Ks(n).
Once we determine the optimal number of suppliers to learn about for each group,
label the groups such that Ψ1(n
∗
1) − K1(n∗1) ≥ Ψ2(n∗2) − K2(n∗2) ≥ · · · ≥ ΨS(n∗S) −
KS(n
∗
S). If the buyer can learn about just one group, it is optimal to learn about group
1 if Ψ1(n
∗
1)−K1(n∗1) > 0. If the buyer can learn about multiple groups, it is optimal to
learn about the first s groups, where s is largest value such that Ψs(n
∗
s)−Ks(n∗s) > 0.
Once again, what initially appears to be an intractable problem — considering the
buyer’s cost versus benefit of learning while taking into account the possibility that
she learns from multiple cost models at once and the cost of learning depends on how
many suppliers she chooses to learn — the problem in fact decomposes and again we
can solve it by examining each supplier group separately.
Learning cost increases in the depth of learning. Suppose the buyer can learn
portions A and X, but the cost of learning increases with the portions learned. (For
simplicity, we focus on just two cost portions, but the results easily extend to multiple
portions.) Our previous sections’ analytical results also apply in this case to determine
the optimal depth of learning.
If Ks(A)+Ks(X) ≥ Ks(AX) (i.e., the cost of learning is subadditive in depth), it
immediately follows from Proposition 2.5-G that the optimal depth to learn in group
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s is d∗s = 0 or AX. This is because, as we proved, the expected benefit of learning
is superadditive in the portions learned, so subadditive learning cost makes the net
benefit superadditive in the portions learned. On the other hand, if Ks(A)+Ks(X) <
Ks(AX) (superadditive), then it is possible that an intermediate level of learning
becomes optimal, i.e., d∗s ∈ {A,X}. In this case, the optimal depth to learn depends
on the particular shape of the learning cost function.
Regardless of the learning cost function’s shape, once we determine the optimal
depth of learning for each group, label the groups such that Ψ1(d
∗
1) − K1(d∗1) ≥
Ψ2(d
∗
2) − K2(d∗2) ≥ · · · ≥ ΨS(d∗S) − KS(d∗S). If the buyer can learn about just one
group, she prefers to learn about group 1 if Ψ1(d
∗
1) − K1(d∗1) > 0. If the buyer can
learn about multiple groups, she prefers to learn about the first s groups, where s is
largest value such that Ψs(d
∗
s)−Ks(d∗s) > 0.
Propositions 2.3-G and 2.5-G can be used to render similar results when the cost
of learning is a function of both the number of suppliers and portions learned. For
example, for any given group s, Proposition 2.3-G implies that the optimal number
of suppliers to learn about will be 0 or Ns if the cost is concave in the number of
suppliers for any given depth ds. Similarly, from Proposition 2.5-G, the optimal depth
to learn about each group will be 0 or AX if the cost of learning is subadditive in
depth for any number of suppliers learned. Finally, after ordering the groups by their
optimal benefits of learning, if the buyer can only learn about one group she prefers
to learn about the highest benefit group, and if she can learn about multiple groups
she learns about all the groups with positive individual benefit.
Example: In this example, all costs are in thousands of dollars. Suppose there
are two groups of suppliers: group 1 has two suppliers, where A1 ∼ U [200, 575], X1 ∼
U [300, 360], only portion A1 is learnable and the cost of learning is a function of the
number of suppliers learned, K1(n) = 10 + 2
√
n (n = 1, 2); group 2 has only one
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supplier, where A2 ∼ U [360, 530], X2 ∼ U [270, 600], both portions A2 and X2 are
learnable and the cost of learning is K2(A) = 12, K2(X) = 13, K2(AX) = 15.
We first determine the optimal learning strategy for group 1. Since K1(n) is
concave in n, the optimal number of suppliers to learn about is either 0 or 2. The
benefit of learning 2 suppliers in group 1 is Ψ1(2) = 83.80 which is greater than the
cost of learning K1(2) = 12.828, so n
∗
1 = 2 and Ψ1(n
∗
1) − K1(n∗1) = 70.972. As for
group 2, since K2(A) +K2(X) ≥ K2(AX), the optimal depth to learn is either 0 or
AX. The benefit of learning AX is Ψ2(AX) = 3.31 which can not cover the cost of
learning K2(AX) = 15, so the optimal depth to learn is d
∗
2 = 0. Thus, the optimal
learning strategy that the buyer should follow is to learn about the two suppliers
in group 1 and not to learn about group 2. In this example, the expected payment
without learning is 764.73. Through learning, the buyer reduces the expected payment
by 83.80/764.73 = 10.96% and the net saving is 70.972/764.73 = 9.28%.
2.7 Relaxing Independence
2.7.1 Correlated costs
Thus far our models have assumed that suppliers’ costs are statistically indepen-
dent from each other. However, it is easy to imagine that in practice some portion of
a supplier’s cost may be correlated to the corresponding portion of another supplier’s
cost. For example, all suppliers might rely on a certain key material or component
from the same upstream source, or perhaps suppliers who are located in the same
industrial zone (e.g., southern China) incur similar labor rates. Unlike the indepen-
dent cost case, when costs are correlated learning about one supplier may reveal cost
information about his competitors, which is relevant to the buyer’s decision about
cost modeling (e.g., whether to learn or not, how much to learn, etc.). In this section
we show how our results extend to the correlated cost setting.
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To extend our model, we assume that the cost of a supplier in group s is rep-
resented by a random variable Cs = As + Xs, where As = A
0 + As + A′s, and
Xs = X
0 + Xs + X ′s. Random variables A
0 and X0 represent portions of A and
X that are common for all suppliers. Random variables As and Xs represent por-
tions that are common for all the suppliers in group s, but independent from all
other suppliers in other groups (if a group s consists of just one supplier, we take
As ≡ Xs ≡ 0). Finally, A′s and X ′s represent portions that are independent across
all suppliers. Let F 0, F s and F ′s be the distributions of A
0, As, and A′s, respectively.
Likewise, X0 ∼ G0, Xs ∼ Gs and X ′s ∼ G′s. As before, Hs = Fs⊗Gs, where As ∼ Fs,
Xs ∼ Gs. Additionally, we define H ′s = F ′s ⊗G′s.
With this setup, supplier cost realizations are arrived at as follows: one draw from
F 0 and one draw from G0 are made and applied to all suppliers; for each group s,
one draw from F s and one draw from Gs are made and applied to just suppliers in
group s; and for each supplier in group s, one draw from F ′s and and one draw from
G′s are made and applied to just that individual supplier. As a check, note that the
case with A0 ≡ X0 ≡ As ≡ Xs ≡ 0 corresponds to our model of independent supplier
costs. Recall that Ns is the number of suppliers in group s. We let random variable
C−s denote the minimum cost among Ns−1 draws from Hs and Nt draws from Ht for
each t ̸= s (these N − 1 draws may be correlated). Let ro denote the original reserve
price set without learning, ro = min(c̄1, c̄2, ..., c̄s). We have the following result.
Proposition 2.6. All previous results hold with the following changes to accommodate
the correlation model:
(i) Adapting Proposition 2.1-G [Relation between learning and cost distributions]:






s, respectively. Moreover, the
benefit of learning Ψ1 decreases in F
0 and F 1, but increases in G0 and G1.
(ii) Adapting Proposition 2.2-G [Preferred group to learn about]: Condition A1 +
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x̄1 ≤st A2 + x̄2 is replaced by A′1 + x̄1 ≤st A′2 + x̄2, and condition C1 ≤st C2 is
replaced by min(ro, C−1)− A0 − A1 ≥st min(ro, C−2)− A0 − A2;
(iii) Adapting Proposition 2.4-G [Preferred portion to learn]: Condition ā1−A1 ≥st
x̄1 − X1 is replaced by ā1 − A′1 ≥st x̄1 − X ′1,min(ro, C−1) − A0 − A1 ≥st
min(ro, C−1)−X0 −X1;
(iv) Propositions 2.3-G [Benefit of learning about multiple groups] and 2.5-G [Ben-
efit of learning multiple portions] hold without any changes.
Under the cost correlation model, some supplier cost portions are independent
across suppliers while others are correlated. It turns out that the effect these costs’
distributions have on the buyer’s benefit of learning depends on whether the cost dis-
tribution governs an independent or correlated portion. For the independent portions,
the effects are exactly as we saw before for the case with completely independent sup-
plier costs (Proposition 2.1-G). For the correlated portions, the benefit of learning
decreases with F 0 and F 1, the distributions governing the portions of learned cost
that are common across multiple suppliers. The intuition is that the new reserve price
stochastically increases in F 0 and F 1 and therefore recovers less profit for the buyer
when it binds. Moreover, increasing F 0 and F 1 may increase the payment without
learning, but unlike the independent cost case, this change “washes out” due to cor-
relation because the new reserve price would increase by exactly the same amount.
Analogously, the benefit of learning increases with G0 and G1, the distributions gov-
erning the portions of the unlearned cost that are common across multiple suppliers,
since the new reserve price is unchanged by this but the contract price in the absence
of learning becomes higher. To summarize, we find that learning is less valuable when
the learned cost portions exhibits more substantial correlation (F 0 and F 1 become
larger), but learning becomes more valuable when the unlearned cost portions exhibit
more substantial correlation (G0 and G1 become larger). The managerial takeaway
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is that, although one may intuitively expect that more correlation will always reduce
the benefit of learning since supplier costs will be more closely matched and compe-
tition will be fiercer, increasing the magnitude of correlated cost drivers can actually
increase the benefit of learning.
In choosing which group to learn about, we need to account for correlation when
determining how effective the revised reserve price will be in lowering the buyer’s
payment. In adapting Proposition 2.2-G for correlation, the first condition focuses on
the supplier-specific uncertainty (A is replaced by A′). This condition is just like the
condition we had in the independent case, capturing the fact that — all else equal —
the buyer prefers learning that will lead to a smaller new reserve price. In the second
condition we subtract out the correlated portions (A0 + As) from the original price,
min(ro, C−s). The reason is that in reaching the original price (without learning), the
correlated portions will be revealed “for free” through competition, so intuitively the
buyer prefers to learn about groups that have less correlation in the costs that will be
learned; as a check, notice that if group 2 has a large within-group correlation governed
by A2, the second condition is more likely to hold and the buyer would prefer to learn
about group 1 instead of group 2. We make a similar modification when determining
which cost portion to learn (adapting Proposition 2.4-G). The managerial insight here
is that, all else equal, the buyer prefers learning about groups and/or cost portions
that exhibit weaker cost correlations in the learned portion because strongly correlated
costs are more apt to be revealed via competition regardless of learning.
For the fully independent costs case we saw that the benefit of learning about
multiple suppliers was additive, and we next ask whether this insight changes in
the presence of supplier cost correlation. One might expect it would, since we just
saw how sensitivity of the benefit of learning and the decision of which group or
portion to learn should account for whether or not the cost portions are correlated
across suppliers. However, Proposition 2.6 shows that the value of cost modeling
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remains additive across suppliers and groups, even with correlation. The reason is
that, regardless of cost correlation, the buyer must still learn about the contract
winner in order for the learning to be beneficial. Similar reasoning gives our final
result, namely that the value of cost modeling is superadditive in cost portions that
are learned about, even under correlation.
2.7.2 Supplier collusion
Cost correlation is not the only reason that supplier bids are not independent. At
firms we have interacted with — in industries ranging from electronics to automotive
parts — buyers have related suspicions of supplier collusion. Collusion dampens
bidding competition, making it less effective. We now extend our analysis to study
the effect of cost modeling in cases with supplier collusion.
In this subsection we allow the possibility that a group t ∈ {1, . . . , S} can be a
bidding ring. Literature on bidding rings dates back to the seminal paper Graham
and Marshall (1987). Krishna (2009) offers a nice distillation of the canonical theory
as follows: (1) the bidders in a ring identify which bidder among them has the lowest
cost; (2) only this bidder submits meaningful bids for the contract (other bidders
submit bids that do not affect the final winning price, e.g., drop out at the reserve
price); (3) after the bidding, the ring shares any surplus gained from collusion. This 3-
step distillation describes so-called efficient collusion, meaning only the “best” bidder
from a colluding ring submits a serious bid for the contract. Graham and Marshall
(1987) identified a simple way that the ring can coordinate its members to achieve
efficient collusion.
Suppose that T of the S supplier groups are bidding rings, and label the indices
such that the bidding rings are groups {1, . . . , T}. Since a ring can maximize its gain
by colluding efficiently, we assume that each ring colludes efficiently and so effectively
collapses into a single “best bidder” who represents that entire ring in the bidding
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process. Not surprisingly, it is a dominant strategy of each ring’s representative
bidder to lower his bid until winning or reaching his true production cost. It is also a
dominant strategy of bidders in groups {T +1, . . . , S} to lower their bid until winning
the contract or reaching their true production cost. All other bidders (members
of rings who are not ring representatives) submit non-serious bids (meaning they
intentionally drop out early, e.g., at the reserve price). For each ring t, define cost
distributions F ringt = 1− (1−Ft)Nt , G
ring
t = 1− (1−Gt)Nt , and H
ring
t = 1− (1−Ht)Nt .
We have the following result.
Proposition 2.7. Propositions 2.1-G, 2.2-G, 2.3-G and 2.4-G hold if each bidding
ring t is replaced with a synthetic group, tring, containing a single supplier whose




In words, synthetic group tring consists of a single supplier whose costs equal the
first order statistic of costs from all suppliers in the bidding ring t. The implication
behind Proposition 2.7 is that buyers can understand the role of cost modeling in
the presence of supplier collusion simply by considering the colluding groups to be
collapsed to representative suppliers.
However, there are some interesting differences that arise. First, note that we no
longer get super-additivity of benefits of learning multiple portions for a colluding
group (namely, Proposition 2.5-G does not hold under collusion, see proof of Propo-
sition 2.7(ii)). This is because in Proposition 2.7 we have collapsed the ring to a
single representative supplier. In fact, if we look at individual suppliers within a
ring, we recover the super-additivity result (see proof of Proposition 2.7(iii)). Thus,
unlike the non-collusion case where super-additivity across portions applied at the
individual supplier level and at the group level, under collusion it only applies at the
individual level. The opposite situation arises for the additivity of benefits of learning
multiple groups (Proposition 2.3-G): Under collusion additivity of benefits holds at
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the group level (per Proposition 2.7), but it turns out that it does not hold at an
individual supplier level (see proof of Proposition 2.7(i); recall that Proposition 2.7
had collapsed the ring into a single representative bidder). Thus, under collusion
there is an interesting difference between group and individual-level learning benefits.
The reason behind this is that collusion changes the way benefits accrue across
suppliers. Recall that when suppliers do not collude, losing suppliers’ cost informa-
tion would always be revealed through the bidding competition, so the buyer only
benefitted when she learned about whoever eventually won the contract. By con-
trast, if a losing supplier is in a winning bidding ring, their cost information will not
be revealed through the competition. In fact, under collusion the buyer can gain a
positive benefit from learning even if the supplier she learns about is not the eventual
contract winner. The upshot is that under collusion the successive benefits of learning
about additional suppliers in the same bidding ring need not be additive. However,
more importantly, the benefit of any amount of learning in the presence of collusion
is always at least as large as it would have been were the collusion absent.
Proposition 2.8. Compared to the non-colluding case, the presence of collusion can
only increase the buyer’s benefit of learning about supplier costs.
2.8 Other Extensions
2.8.1 Learning versus more bidders
Thus far we have shown that learning about suppliers can decrease the buyer’s
procurement cost. Of course, the buyer could also lower her cost by locating new
suppliers who will bid for the contract. In practice, this option is very expensive
and time-consuming; at Fortune 500 companies we interacted with it typically takes
months to locate and qualify new suppliers to bid in an auction. This raises an impor-
tant question: When designing a supply base, should the buyer focus on fostering her
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knowledge about her existing suppliers, or instead focus on locating and qualifying
new suppliers? We address this question by comparing the benefits of adding new
suppliers to the benefit of learning about existing suppliers.
We consider a buyer who has a supply base consisting of a group of N non-
colluding suppliers whose costs are ex ante symmetric but possibly correlated. We use
the correlation model from §2.7.1, but drop the group index s since there effectively
is only one group; thus, for example, H = F ⊗ G represents the suppliers’ cost
distribution. (With multiple groups (ex ante asymmetric suppliers) and/or collusion,
the key insights do not change but the expressions are more complicated.)
As in §2.6, suppose that there is a cost to learn about each supplier. We compare
the following two options: (a) The buyer learns about m out of N suppliers (and
learns the realization of portion A for each of these m suppliers); (b) The buyer
locates y more suppliers, for a total of N + y suppliers. The benefit of option (a),
learning m suppliers, is given by mΨ, where Ψ is the benefit of learning about a
single supplier (see Proposition 2.6 part (iv)). Let Φ(y) , E[C2:N − C2:N+y] denote
the benefit of adding y suppliers, where C2:n denotes the second-lowest order statistic
from n draws from distribution H.
We compare the benefit of learning, mΨ, and the benefit of locating, Φ(y), in the
following proposition. We let ⌈s⌉ denote the smallest integer that is greater than or
equal to s.
Proposition 2.9. The buyer prefers learning about existing suppliers to locating new






As one can see, if the benefit of learning each individual supplier, Ψ, is very
small then m∗ > N and learning will not be better than locating even if the buyer
learns about all N existing suppliers. Likewise, the same is true if the number of
additional suppliers, y, is very large. To make the comparison between learning and
locating more meaningful, we consider a case where learning is effective and y is not
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extremely large. Namely, suppose that the buyer can learn a supplier’s exact cost
through learning, and compare this to the benefit of adding one new supplier.




, and m∗ = ⌈γN ·N⌉. Learning about m
suppliers completely is better than locating one more supplier if and only if m ≥ m∗.
Moreover, for any cost distribution H ′, γN ∈ (0, 1), and thus m∗ ≤ N .
Costs that are common to all suppliers “wash out” in competition and therefore
do not affect the benefit of learning. This is why the threshold m∗ in Proposition
2.10 only depends on the cost portion that is independent across suppliers, which is
governed by H ′ (whose tail is denoted by H̄ ′). The proposition implies that, when
cost modeling is precise enough, learning can provide larger cost saving than locating
a new supplier.
It is interesting to note that the minimum number of existing suppliers that the
buyer needs to learn about in order to prefer it to locating one new supplier can be
quite small. See Table 2.1, which gives the minimum (rightmost column) for several
well-known distributions. For all the cases in the table, the benefit from learning
the costs of just two (out of N) suppliers exceeds the benefit from locating a new
supplier. In fact, when supplier costs follow a uniform or power function distribution,
our result shows that for a buyer with small existing supply base (N = 2 for uniform
and N ≤ ν + 1 for power distribution), learning the cost of just one supplier is
better than locating a new supplier. Our result contrasts with the famous finding of
Bulow and Klemperer (1996), who showed it is optimal for a buyer to locate one more
supplier (and intensify competition) rather than set an optimal reserve price with the
existing supply base. This is because a buyer in our paper has ability to learn about
suppliers’ cost (which is certainly true in procurement settings), and this capability
enables the buyer to set a more effective reserve price than a buyer in Bulow and
Klemperer (1996).
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Distribution CDF γN m
∗
Uniform H ′(c) = c · I0≤c≤1 2N+2 1(N = 2); 2(N ≥ 3)
Exponential H ′(c) = (1− e−λc) · Ic≥0 2N+1 2
Power-function H ′(c) = cν · I0≤c≤1 1+1/νN+1+1/ν 1(N ≤ ν + 1); 2(N > ν + 1)
(ν > 1)
Table 2.1: Examples of Proposition 2.10
2.8.2 The effects of buyer power on the benefits of Learning
In this paper, we focused our analysis on the reverse open-descending auction
where the buyer sets a reserve price as a starting point and then the suppliers compete
by lowering their bids until only one bidder remains. We study this mechanism
because it is analytically tractable and extremely prevalent in practice. However, one
may wonder what the buyer’s learning preferences will be under other mechanisms.
The buyer’s power relative to her suppliers determines which mechanism she can
choose. Following the reasoning of Bulow and Klemperer (1996), we can classify a
buyer’s power into three levels.
• Zero power: A buyer with zero power can not set a reserve price and the con-
tract payment is completely determined by suppliers’ bid competition in a re-
verse open-descending auction without a reserve price. In reality, this could
correspond to a small mom and pop firm who cannot scare suppliers by setting
a reserve price because she has little clout over her large manufacturer suppliers.
In this case, one can show that learning provides no benefit since the buyer has
no power to apply any cost information.
• Moderate power: A buyer with moderate power can set a reserve price. This
was the case documented in Beall et al. (2003), which surveyed large (Fortune
500) firms, many of whom spend billions of dollars on procurement each year.
Through learning, the buyer can apply the cost information to set a more ag-
gressive reserve price and reduce the contract payment. This is the case that
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we analyzed in this paper.
• Absolute power: A buyer with absolute power relative to her suppliers can
design and commit to any mechanism. This allows her to design, for example,
an optimal mechanism. This category of buyer is of theoretical interest, but
in reality few buyers have such power (firms like Apple may be an exception).
One can show that a buyer with absolute power does not have to exert effort
to learn about suppliers’ costs before the auction. Instead, she can induce the
suppliers to voluntarily divulge any learnable cost information practically for
free before the auction, simply by employing random post-auction audits on
learnable portions and levying large penalties on suppliers found to have lied
about their costs. In reality, these penalties could take the form of disallowing
future bids from the supplier, which might be significant if the buyer comprises
a substantial portion of market demand.
Thus, although one might expect that buyers with more power will have more
incentive to utilize cost modeling since a powerful buyer can utilize the information
better than a weak buyer, we conclude from the above discussion that a buyer’s
inclination to undertake cost modeling on her suppliers is not monotonic in her power.
Since buyers with zero power are too weak to apply any information and buyers with
absolute power essentially obtain learnable information for free without cost modeling,
learning via cost modeling is only interesting for buyers with moderate power. This
is why our paper focused on this latter case.
2.9 Conclusions
In this paper, we ask whether a buyer should deploy cost modeling to learn about
suppliers who will compete for a contract. Intuitively, because competitive bidding
and cost modeling are both ways that a buyer can discover information about sup-
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pliers’ costs, and moreover since cost modeling itself is an expensive undertaking,
careful analysis is needed to understand if and when cost modeling should be used
in conjunction with supplier competition. To our knowledge, this paper is the first
study of cost modeling and its interactions with competitive bidding.
Addressing research question 1 (How does one characterize the benefit of cost
modeling?), we show that learning prior to competitive bidding enables the buyer to
set a tighter reserve price. In doing so the buyer seeks to truncate suppliers’ surplus.
However, when there are competing suppliers, the buyer does not always receive a
positive benefit from learning. In fact, the benefit of learning is positive only when the
new reserve price actively truncates the surplus of the contract winner, and learning
about suppliers who wind up losing the contract provides no useful information to the
buyer, since these suppliers’ costs will be revealed during the competitive bid process
anyway. Of course, this makes the buyer’s problem difficult because she cannot ex
ante predict which supplier will win — after all, the suppliers’ costs (which the buyer
does not know) determine who wins the contract. Summarizing the above, learning
is more valuable to the extent that the reserve price is likely to truncate the surplus
of the contract winner.
Turning to research question 2 (If the buyer chooses to develop a cost model,
which supplier(s) should she learn about?), we find that the key criterion is not to
learn about the supplier whose learnable cost is more uncertain, but to learn about the
supplier who is more likely to win and whose learnable cost, once learned, will enable
the buyer to lower the reserve price the most. Moreover, one might intuitively expect
it to be redundant to learn about several competing suppliers. However, we find that
the benefit of learning about multiple suppliers is actually additive across suppliers.
Hence, managers should strongly consider learning about multiple suppliers at once,
when the cost of learning is linear or concave in the number of suppliers learned.
Addressing research question 3 (Which cost portion(s) should the buyer learn?),
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we find that the buyer prefers to learn about the portion which can resolve more
uncertainty. Surprisingly, we also find that the benefit of learning multiple portions at
once is even greater than the sum of the benefits of learning each portion in isolation.
Coupled with our insights regarding research question 2, this suggests that — all else
equal — learning fewer suppliers in depth is preferable to learning more suppliers
superficially. Thus, staffing a procurement department with specialists having deep
but narrow domain expertise (e.g., of a particular type of production method used
by some suppliers) may be preferable to having generalists with broader but more
limited knowledge about the industry’s general cost drivers.
Addressing research question 4 (What is the optimal learning strategy?), we find
that the buyer can first divide all suppliers into several groups based on their cost
structures, next figure out the optimal level of learning for each group, and then the
optimal learning strategy is to learn about the groups with a positive net benefit of
learning. Depending on the cost to learn various groups to varying depths, we show
that the buyer can adopt a mix-and-match strategy of learning, whereby she learns
some groups deeply, others superficially, and some not at all.
Finally, research question 5 considers the effect of the underlying business context.
Our insights are robust to correlations across supplier costs, and surprisingly — even
though correlation tends to make competition fiercer by increasing the parity between
suppliers’ costs — larger correlated costs across suppliers can actually increase the
benefit of learning. We show that supplier collusion short circuits the price discovery
of the competitive bidding process and makes cost modeling aimed at learning about
supplier costs even more valuable for the buyer. We also show that learning just a few
suppliers deeply can be preferable to adding another bidder. Lastly, we examined how
the buyer’s power relative to her suppliers affects her benefit of learning. Interestingly,
we find that buyers with moderate power benefit more from learning than buyers with
zero or absolute power.
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For simplicity our discussion focused on two cost portions, A and X. However,
our results extend to multiple cost portions. Suppose that supplier i’s cost is given




2 + · · ·+ Zim + ϵi, where the Zij’s are learnable cost portions and ϵi is
unlearnable. For any subsets R, T ⊆ {1, 2, . . . ,m}, R ∩ T = ∅, we can apply all the








j, and ϵi = Ci−Ai−Xi.
Our paper is an important first step in understanding how two very common
procurement tools — cost modeling and competitive bidding — interact. It has the
potential to help procurement managers make better decisions about how to apply
cost modeling in practice. We hope that it spurs further research into the role of cost
modeling in supply chain and sourcing strategies.
2.10 Proofs
In our proofs we let Ai, Xi, and Ci denote supplier i’s cost random variables, and
let ai, xi, and ci denote the cost realizations. This notation suppresses the group
index s, but it is understood that if suppliers i and j are in the same group (i.e., are
homogeneous) then Ai and Aj have the same distribution, Xi and Xj have the same
distribution, and Ci and Cj have the same distribution. Also, we let ψ
1, ψ2, and
ψ1&2, respectively, denote the benefits of learning about supplier 1, supplier 2, and
both supplier 1 and supplier 2, where Ψ1 = E[ψ1], Ψ2 = E[ψ2], and Ψ1&2 = E[ψ1&2]
denote the expected benefits of learning.
Proof of Proposition 2.3-G
The proof of Proposition 2.1-G and 2.2-G utilizes Proposition 2.3-G; therefore we
prove Proposition 2.3-G first.
It suffices to prove that when there are N suppliers, the benefit of learning any
two of them is additive. Consider any suppliers 1 and 2, who may or may not be in
the same group. We want to show ψ1&2 = ψ1 + ψ2. We consider the sample paths
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such that Ci ̸= Cj(∀i ̸= j). Since Ci(i = 1, 2, ..., N) are continuous random variables,
the probability that Ci ̸= Cj(∀i ̸= j) is 1. Let C[k] denote the kth order statistic of
C1, C2, . . . , CN , and define C−i , minj ̸=i{Cj}. We have
ψ1&2 =[min(ro, C[2])−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+,
=I{C1=C[1]}[min(r
o, C[2])−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+
+ I{C2=C[1]}[min(r





o, C[2])−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+,
=I{C1=C[1]}[min(r
o, C[2])−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+
+ I{C2=C[1]}[min(r
o, C[2])−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+,
=I{C1=C[1]}[min(r
o, C−1)−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+
+ I{C2=C[1]}[min(r
o, C−2)−min(A1 + x̄1, A2 + x̄2)]+,
=I{C1=C[1]}[min(r
o, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+ + I{C2=C[1]}[min(r
o, C−2)− (A2 + x̄2)]+.
The third equality follows since Ci = C[1], i ≥ 3 implies C1 ≥ C[2], C2 ≥ C[2], so
min(A1+ x̄1, A2+ x̄2) ≥ min(C1, C2) ≥ C[2] ≥ min(ro, C[2]). The final equality follows
since C1 = C[1] ⇒ C−1 ≤ C2 ≤ A2 + x̄2 ⇒ min(ro, C−1)− (A2 + x̄2) ≤ 0.
By similar arguments,
ψ1 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = I{C1=C[1]}[min(r
o, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+,
ψ2 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A2 + x̄2)]+ = I{C2=C[1]}[min(r
o, C−2)− (A2 + x̄2)]+.
Hence ψ1&2 = ψ1 + ψ2 almost surely.
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Proof of Proposition 2.1-G
Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1. We have the benefit of learning about supplier 1
ψ1 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+.
This is because: when C1 = C[1], C[2] = C−1; when C1 ≥ C[2], A1 + x̄1 ≥ C1 ≥ C[2] ≥
C−1 ⇒ min(ro, C−1) ≤ min(ro, C[2]) ≤ A1 + x̄1.
Since ψ1 increases in C−1 and decreases in A1, the expected benefit of learning
group 1, Ψ1 = N1 · E[ψ1], increases as the distribution of C−1 becomes larger and
decreases as the distribution of A1 becomes larger. This explains part (i.a), (i.b),
(i.c), (ii.b) and (ii.c). Part (ii.a) is because when group 1 has multiple suppliers, F1
affects not only A1 but also C−1.
Proof of Proposition 2.2-G
Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1 and supplier 2 is in group 2. We have
ψ1 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+, and
ψ2 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A2 + x̄2)]+ = [min(ro, C−2)− (A2 + x̄2)]+.
Since ro is constant and C1 ≤st C2, we have min(ro, C−1) ≥st min(ro, C−2) (see
page 7 in Müller and Stoyan (2002)). Also, since A1 + x̄1 ≤st A2 + x̄2, we have
−(A1 + x̄1) ≥st −(A2 + x̄2). Because (C−1, A1) are independent random variables
and (C−2, A2) are independent random variables, from Theorem 1.2.17 in Müller and
Stoyan (2002), we can conclude that min(ro, C−1)−(A1+x̄1) ≥st min(ro, C−2)−(A2+
x̄2) and ψ
1 ≥st ψ2. It then follows that Ψ1 ≥ Ψ2. Finally, by applying Proposition
2.3-G, the expected benefit of learning group 1 is Ψ1 = N1 · Ψ1 and the expected
benefit of learning group 2 is Ψ2 = N2 · Ψ2. Since N1 ≥ N2 and Ψ1 ≥ Ψ2, we have
Ψ1 ≥ Ψ2.
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Proof of Proposition 2.4-G
Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1. The benefit of learning supplier 1’s portion A1,
or X1, are
ψ1,A = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+,
ψ1,X = [min(ro, C[2])− (X1 + ā1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− (X1 + ā1)]+.
Since C−1, A1, X1 are independent,
ā1 − A1 ≥st x̄1 −X1 ⇒ A1 + x̄1 ≤st X1 + ā1 ⇒ ψ1,A ≥st ψ1,X ,
which implies Ψ1,A = E[ψ1,A] ≥ Ψ1,X = E[ψ1,X ].
The result extends to the case of any number of suppliers in the same group. By
Proposition 2.3-G, the expected benefit of learning portion A of group 1 is ΨA1 =
N1 ·Ψ1,A and the expected benefit of learning portion X of group 1 is ΨX1 = N1 ·Ψ1,X .
Thus we have ΨA1 ≥ ΨX1 .
Proof of Proposition 2.5-G
The proof uses the following technical lemma, which is stated and proved below.
Lemma 2.3. If Y, Z, T are positive, then (Y + Z − T )+ ≥ (Y − T )+ + (Z − T )+.
Proof of Lemma 2.3.
If Y ≥ T, Z ≥ T , then (Y + Z − T )+ = Y + Z − T ≥ (Y − T ) + (Z − T ) =
(Y − T )+ + (Z − T )+;
if Y ≥ T, Z < T , then (Y +Z−T )+ = Y +Z−T ≥ Y −T = (Y −T )++(Z−T )+;
if Y < T,Z ≥ T , then (Y +Z−T )+ = Y +Z−T ≥ Z−T = (Y −T )++(Z−T )+;
if Y < T,Z < T , then (Y + Z − T )+ ≥ 0 = (Y − T )+ + (Z − T )+.
Hence, (Y + Z − T )+ ≥ (Y − T )+ + (Z − T )+.
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Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1. The benefit of learning supplier 1’s portion A1
is
ψ1,A = [min(ro, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [(ā1 − A1)− (c̄1 −min(ro, C−1))]+.
Similarly, the benefit of learning supplier 1’s portion X1 is
ψ1,X = [(x̄1 −X1)− (c̄1 −min(ro, C−1))]+,
and the benefit of learning supplier 1’s both portions A1 and X1 is
ψ1,AX = [(c̄1−C1)−(c̄1−min(ro, C−1))]+ = [(ā1−A1)+(x̄1−X1)−(c̄1−min(ro, C−1))]+.
Since the reserve price without learning is ro = minNi=1(c̄i) ≤ c̄1, we have c̄1 −
min(ro, C−1) ≥ 0. Also, because ā1 − A1 ≥ 0 and x̄1 − X1 ≥ 0, Lemma 2.3 implies
ψ1,AX ≥ ψ1,A + ψ1,X . By Proposition 2.3-G, we have ψAX1 ≥ ψA1 + ψX1 .
Proof of Propositions 2.1-2.5
Propositions 2.1, 2.2, 2.3, 2.4 and 2.5 are direct consequences of the corresponding
generalized propositions.
Proof of Proposition 2.6
(i) Adapting Proposition 2.1-G: Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1. We have the
benefit of learning about supplier 1
ψ1 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− (A1 + x̄1)]+
= [min(ro − A0 − A1, C−1 − A0 − A1)− (A′1 + x̄1)]+.
Since min(ro−A0−A1, C−1−A0−A1) decreases in A0, A1 and increases in X0, X1,
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the expected benefit of learning group 1, Ψ1 = N1 · E[ψ1], decreases in F 0, F 1 and
increases in G0, G1.
(ii) Adapting Proposition 2.2-G: Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1 and supplier 2
is in group 2. We have
ψ1 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− A0 − A1 − (A′1 + x̄1)]+, and
ψ2 = [min(ro, C[2])− (A2 + x̄2)]+ = [min(ro, C−2)− A0 − A2 − (A′2 + x̄2)]+.
Because min(ro, C−i) − A0 − Ai and A′i + x̄i(i = 1, 2) are independent random
variables, from Theorem 1.2.17 in Müller and Stoyan (2002), we can conclude that
min(ro, C−1) − A0 − A1 − (A′1 + x̄1) ≥st min(ro, C−2) − A0 − A2 − (A′2 + x̄2) and
ψ1 ≥st ψ2.
(iii) Adapting Proposition 2.4-G: Suppose supplier 1 is in group 1. The benefit of
learning supplier 1’s portion A1, or X1, are
ψ1,A = [min(ro, C[2])− (A1 + x̄1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)− A0 − A1 − (A′1 + x̄1)]+,
ψ1,X = [min(ro, C[2])− (X1 + ā1)]+ = [min(ro, C−1)−X0 −X1 − (X ′1 + ā1)]+.
Since ā1−A′1 ≥st x̄1−X ′1, A′1+x̄1 ≤st X ′1+ā1. Because min(ro, C−1)−A0−A1 and
A′1+x̄1 are independent, and min(r
o, C−1)−X0−X1 andX ′1+ā1 are independent, from
Theorem 1.2.17 in Müller and Stoyan (2002), we can conclude that min(ro, C−1) −
A0 − A1 − (A′1 + x̄1) ≥st min(ro, C−1)−X0 −X1 − (X ′1 + ā1) and ψ1,A ≥st ψ1,X .
(iv) Proofs of Proposition 2.3-G and 2.5-G can be directly applied to the correla-
tion case.
Proof of Proposition 2.7
For a bidding ring t, the representative bid is the lowest of all suppliers’ costs,
which is governed by distribution Hringt . If the buyer learns about portion A of all
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suppliers in bidding ring t, then the new reserve price is min(r0, At[1:Nt]+ x̄t), in which
At[1:Nt] is governed by distribution F
ring
t . Similarly for portion X, the new reserve
price set by learning about portion X is min(r0, Xt[1:Nt] + āt), in which Xt[1:Nt] is
governed by distribution Gringt . This explains why Propositions 2.1-G, 2.2-G, 2.3-G
and 2.4-G hold if each bidding ring is replaced with a representative supplier.
Next, we will show that Proposition 2.5-G only applies at individual supplier level
but not at the group level, and Proposition 2.3-G does not hold at individual level.
(i) Proposition 2.3-G does not hold at individual level. We provide a counter-
example. Suppose there are two colluding suppliers who have the same cost structure
with upper bounds ā = 1, x̄ = 1, c̄ = 2. The cost realizations are a1 = 0.2, x1 =
0.5, c1 = 0.7; a2 = 0.5, x2 = 0.3, c2 = 0.8. Since the two suppliers are colluding,
supplier 2 will not submit meaningful bid and the contract price without learning is
c̄ = 2, so the benefits of learning are ψ1 = [c̄− (a1+ x̄)]+ = 0.8, ψ2 = [c̄− (a2+ x̄)]+ =
0.5 and ψ1&2 = [c̄ − (min(a1, a2) + x̄)]+ = 0.8. The additivity does not hold since
ψ1&2 < ψ1 + ψ2.
(ii) Proposition 2.5-G does not hold at group level. Consider the same example as
in (i), the benefits of learning both suppliers are ψA = [c̄− (min(a1, a2) + x̄)]+ = 0.8,
ψX = [c̄ − (min(x1, x2) + ā)]+ = 0.7 and ψAX = [c̄ − min(c1, c2)]+ = 1.3. The
super-additivity does not hold since ψAX < ψA + ψX .
(iii) Proposition 2.5-G applies at individual level. We can use the proof of Proposi-
tion 2.5-G, while C−1 in that proof stands for the minimum cost of all other suppliers
not in bidding ring 1.
Proof of Proposition 2.8
When suppliers collude, fewer bids are submitted and thus the contract price
without learning is higher. Since the new reserve price is the same, the benefit of
learning (which equals to the gap between the contract price without learning and
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the new reserve price) is higher in the presence of collusion.
Proof of Proposition 2.9
The benefit of learning m suppliers is mΨ, and the benefit of locating y suppliers
is Φ(y). Hence, the buyer prefers learning to locating if and only if mΨ ≥ Φ(y) ⇐⇒
m ≥ Φ(y)
Ψ
⇐⇒ m ≥ m∗ = ⌈Φ(y)
Ψ
⌉.
Proof of Proposition 2.10
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′
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Suppose C ′ is distributed over interval [c′, c̄′] with density function h′ and CDF
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We utilize the following recursive relationship from David and Joshi (1968):

























Procurement Auctions with Error-Prone RFQs
3.1 Introduction
As suppliers become increasingly sophisticated and move up the value chain, firms
can enjoy cost savings by outsourcing “non-core” aspects of their business. For exam-
ple, the average US manufacture spends roughly 57% of its revenue purchasing from
external suppliers (U.S. Department of Commerce, 2011). However, while relying
on the external suppliers, these firms gradually lose expertise in internal design and
production of the outsourced parts.
Due to this loss of expertise, a buyer might find it difficult to always design a
perfect request for quotes (RFQ) that takes into account every design specification
detail, and thus is susceptible to making an “error” such as incorrect design, omis-
sion, and misspecification. An RFQ error may only be discovered after the contract
has been signed with one supplier and even after the production process has begun.
For example, a buyer trying to outsource a newly designed item provides a list of
specifications in the RFQ and selects a supplier via competitive bidding; then after
a few months into production, the buyer might start to experience field failures, and
realize that the item needs to be redesigned for better fitness of use. This scenario
also happens for capital equipment. When the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) signed a
$874 million fixed-price contract for high-tech mail sorting machine systems with one
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of its largest contractors, Northrop Grumman Corporation, USPS failed to provide
accurate design specifications and later imposed numerous after-the-fact changes to
the design requirement (Federal Times , 2012).
In the event of a flawed RFQ and corresponding change orders, the buyer incurs
direct cost, such as the cost of delay due to redesign. In fact, in the USPS and
Northrop example, the machine systems were supposed to be deployed in 47 cities
but were delayed for almost 10 months, which caused the USPS extra labor costs of
$394 million. Costs also are incurred by the supplier, such as the cost of adapting
to the new design and the opportunity cost of extended project time. For example,
Northrop claimed $179 million for adapting to all the change orders. Unfortunately,
the USPS and Northrop failed to agree on the responsibility and compensation for
the redesign, which led to a lawsuit of hundreds of millions of dollars (Federal Times ,
2012).
While the lawsuit between the USPS and Northrop is still unresolved, in other
cases when redesign is completely and clearly due to the buyer’s fault, the buyer
has to pay the supplier a redesign fee which typically should cover not only the
redesign cost incurred by the supplier but also some extra profit. This is because
the redesign is due to no fault of the supplier (it is the buyer who designed a flawed
RFQ) and it’s unfair to force the supplier to undertake additional work and switch
to new production procedure for which he earns no profit. In fact, in government
contracting, this type of compensation is referred to as “equitable adjustment”. In
a typical equitable adjustment, the supplier documents all his cost associated with
the redesign and submits it to the buyer, who should then pay the redesign cost plus
a profit margin to compensate the supplier for the fact that the buyer changes the
original contract specifications.
When RFQ error results in high redesign expenses (in the form of direct cost
incurred by the buyer and the redesign fee paid to the supplier as well), the buyer
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may have incentive to discover the RFQ error earlier. However, it is usually difficult
for the buyer to discover the RFQ error by herself since she does not retain the in-house
production expertise which can be critical in designing a perfect RFQ. For example,
many automotive OEMs have reduced their engineering staff. Because production
technology changes rapidly, it is difficult for those automotive OEMs to control every
detailed specification and thus are prone to making an error. The buyer can choose
to rehire engineering staff or hire an outside expert to vet RFQ specifications. Those
approaches are expensive: We want to investigate whether it is worthwhile to pursue
them and whether other ways exist to substitute buyer’s lost expertise — for example,
leveraging suppliers’ expertise.
Suppliers can be more knowledgeable than the buyer since they are experts in
production. This type of asymmetric information is present in all kinds of industries:
Northrop probably knows better than USPS about how to build a machine; A con-
struction contractor knows better than the house owner about the eventual problems
before tearing down the walls. After receiving a flawed RFQ, some suppliers can
recognize the error right away and thus foresee an opportunity to earn windfall profit
out of the inevitable redesign. Returning to the construction example, once the house
walls are opened up, there is usually little a house owner can do and the contractor
gets opportunities for lucrative change orders. Therefore, even if suppliers detect the
error beforehand, they have incentive to keep silent. Suppliers will bid more aggres-
sively in order to win the business, hoping that they will recoup the profit margin
later. As a senior certified public accountant Baker (2000) puts it “many of them
[suppliers] will submit low-price bids in order to secure the job and then sit in their
offices and pray for change orders to arise — that is where they make their money.”
One may wonder whether it is illegal for a supplier who knows the existence of error
but choose not to tell. The bottom line is that it is often really difficult to prove
what people knew or should have known. For example, the contractor could feign
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ignorance about “surprises” that are uncovered during the construction process by
claiming that every house is different (which is true) and one never knows what will
arise (which is maybe less true).
Not every supplier is so capable of detecting an error due to limited experience or
production capability. Suppliers can have different levels of error-detecting expertise
and thus follow different bidding strategies when they compete for a contract. We
analyze how these dynamics affect the buyer’s procurement decisions.
To summarize, we examine the problem where a buyer holds liability and pays
dearly for possible RFQ error, and it is possible that some suppliers are able to detect
the error ahead of time. More specifically, we investigate the following three research
questions:
Research Question 1: How is the buyer’s payment (including contract price and
possible redesign expenses) affected by the possibility of RFQ error and
suppliers’ expertise in detecting the error?
Research Question 2: Can the buyer design some alternative mechanism to stem
supplier windfall profit out of redesign?
Research Question 3: Can the buyer leverage suppliers’ error-detecting expertise
to preempt RFQ error?
Answers to these research questions are summarized in §3.7. We review related
literature in §3.2, and introduce the model in §3.3. Section 3.4 analyzes a motivating
example with two suppliers and supplier production cost following two-type distribu-
tion. In Section 3.5, we generalize the results to N -supplier case with general cost
distribution, and propose the idea of “pre-pay” to stem supplier windfall profit out
of redesign. We incorporate the redesign cost incurred by both the buyer and the
supplier in Section 3.6, and propose the idea of “error-bounty” to preempt RFQ error.
Proofs of results are furnished in §3.8.
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3.2 Literature Review
Many papers examine various operational aspects of how procurement processes
might go “wrong”. For example, some suppliers are not capable of producing the
required item, or even worse, they provide defective items that later require recall re-
sulting in huge loss. Consequently, buyers need to take into account supplier quality
as well as cost (Che, 1993; Beil and Wein, 2003; Kostamis et al., 2009) and consider
exerting efforts to qualify suppliers (Wan and Beil , 2009; Wan et al., 2012). Sup-
pliers also may be unreliable in their delivery schedule due to natural disasters like
hurricanes or earthquakes. In this case, buyer can consider multisourcing to mitigate
supply risk (Parlar and Perry , 1996; Tomlin, 2006). Unreliable suppliers themselves
can also provide price and quality guarantees to better compete against more reli-
able suppliers (Gümüş et al., 2012). Most of the existing literature investigates the
potential non-performance from the supplier side assuming buyer’s RFQ is perfect as
given; however, our paper considers the story from the buyer side — a buyer lacking
production expertise is prone to designing a flawed RFQ.
One type of imperfect RFQ is studied in the literature of incomplete contract,
where the contract does not cover all contingencies and future duties are intention-
ally left unspecified. There exist theoretical papers (Hart and Moore, 1988) as well
as empirical papers (Bajari et al., 2006; Crocker and Reynolds , 1993). Incomplete
contract is imperfect in the sense that some specifications are not explicitly defined
since there is too much uncertainty and neither the buyer nor the suppliers can ex-
actly foresee the future changes. However, our paper models a buyer making an error
(i.e., omission, misspecification) in an RFQ, and experienced suppliers recognize the
existence of the error. Suppliers’ error-detecting expertise is an important factor cap-
tured in our paper. We analyze how supplier expertise affects the buyer’s sourcing
strategy and whether the buyer can leverage supplier expertise to make improvements
in her RFQs.
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Bidders’ obtaining further information about the auction item is also observed in
practice. For example, in U.S. timber auctions (Athey and Levin, 1999), after the
Forest Service publicly announces the tract characteristics, each bidder can further
inspect the tract and get his/her own estimate. Hence, experienced bidders can be
more informed than their competitors and the auctioneer. A similar phenomenon
is also observed in other natural resource auctions. Hendricks and Porter (1988)
examine off-shore oil drilling and discover that neighbor firms are better informed
than non-neighbor firms. In these forward auctions, bidders’ advanced information
cannot change the auction item (e.g., the characteristics of tract is determined by
nature). However, in procurement auctions, suppliers’ expertise can take a role in
improving the RFQ. We propose a creative approach to induce suppliers to reveal
their knowledge to the buyer and consequently make the entire supply chain more
efficient. To our best knowledge, our paper is the first to analyze how a buyer can
leverage supplier error-detecting expertise to preempt an RFQ error.
We model suppliers have different production costs as well as different levels of
error-detecting expertise, which also relates our paper to the literature of multidi-
mensional type bidders, such as Maskin (1992); Pesendorfer and Swinkels (2000);
and Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). As a consequence of multidimensional type, the
existence of bidding equilibrium cannot be proved and none of these papers explic-
itly characterize the bidding functions for the general case. We tackle this problem
by first considering a special case where a supplier’s production cost can either be
low or high, deriving the bidding functions (although complicated enough even for
this two-type distribution, see full version of Lemma 3.1 in Section 3.8) and gaining
some insights. Then we extend the insights to a more general case using an indirect
approach that does not rely on closed-form bidding functions.
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3.3 Model
We consider a buyer who wants to allocate a single, indivisible production (service)
contract to one supplier. At the beginning of a procurement cycle, a buyer sends out
an RFQ (which we call the initial RFQ) to N ex ante identical suppliers who will
compete for the contract in an auction. Specifically, let Xi, i = 1, . . . , n, be a random
variable that represents supplier i’s production cost (or the minimum acceptable price
which includes a profit margin) to fulfill the contract as specified by the initial RFQ.
We assume that Xi are independently drawn from a distribution FX(·).
A distinctive feature of our model is that the buyer’s initial RFQ may contain
an error, which needs to be rectified through redesign and rework. This RFQ error
originates from the buyer’s lack of production expertise and results in omission or
misspecification of critical requirements and design flaws. For example, the buyer
incorrectly indicates the required material strength for a part to function, or the buyer
incorrectly specifies the physical dimensions (e.g., weight, size) of a component. Let
T be a random variable representing the severity of the buyer’s RFQ error and FT (·)
be its distribution. We assume that the larger T is, the more severe (and costly) the
buyer’s error. Without loss of generality, T = 0 represents the case where the initial
RFQ does not contain an error.
When the initial RFQ is error-free, the winning supplier fulfills the contract at
the price determined by the auction. However, if the buyer discovers an error in the
initial RFQ after a supplier partially or completely fulfills the original contract (e.g.,
a machine produced according to the initial RFQ fails in a field test), a considerable
amount of work (which includes redesign, refurbishing, and building a new machine
or part) must follow to rectify the error. As the USPS/Northrup example illustrates,
redesign and rework can be costly to both buyer and supplier. The redesign is costly
to the buyer because she may incur direct cost of designing a new RFQ, lose profit
opportunity or incur cost associated with delay in the contract fulfillment. The sup-
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plier also incurs cost associated with a redesign, which includes direct cost of labor,
material, and opportunity cost for using production resources. Let Cb and Cs be
redesign costs incurred by the buyer and the supplier, respectively. We assume that
both Cb and Cs are dependent on the severity of the error, T (we omit the depen-
dence of Cb and Cs on T when it is obvious). Let Fb|T and Fs|T be the corresponding
distributions. In addition to the cost that the supplier incurs, the buyer may have to
guarantee compensation for the supplier to perform extra work to correct the error,
which we call windfall profit. We use a random variable, R, to represent the windfall
profit, and a function, FR|T (·), to represent its distribution. We assume that both
redesign costs and windfall profit stochastically increase in the error severity, T .
Suppliers are heterogeneous in their abilities to detect the RFQ error before sub-
mitting bids. In other words, some suppliers have better technical expertise than
others to recognize the buyer’s RFQ error. To model this, we assume that there
are two types of suppliers in the marketplace — informed and uninformed suppliers:
An informed supplier is capable of detecting the error and its severity, T = t; An
uninformed supplier knows that the initial RFQ may have an error, but is unable to
detect it at the time of bidding. An supplier’s type is his private information and
is independent from others. Let p (∈ [0, 1]) be the probability that a supplier is the
informed type. Two special cases are important in our analysis: p = 0 represents a
situation where all suppliers are uninformed, and p = 1 represents a situation where
all suppliers are informed.
In our base model, the buyer holds an open-bid reverse auction to award the
contract. The open-bid reverse auction is a widely used practice where each supplier
can observe his competitors’ bids and continue to lower his own bid until either
winning the auction or dropping out. Although our model uses an open-bid reverse
auction, none of our results depend on the auction format. In fact, all of our results
hold in other auctions such as a sealed-bid first price auction, a dutch auction, and
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Figure 3.1: Model Schematic
so on: See Section 3.7.
Given this set-up, a supplier’s bidding strategy (the drop-out price) depends not
only on his production cost to fulfill the initial RFQ but also on his knowledge about
the RFQ error. An informed supplier knows whether the RFQ contains an error,
and if so, how severe it is. Consequently, he has better information about costs and
windfall profit associated with the redesign than an uninformed buyer who cannot
predict the presence and severity of the RFQ error. Due to this difference, informed
suppliers and uninformed suppliers will use different bidding strategies in an auction.
The time line of our model is summarized in Figure 3.1.
To build up intuition, we first analyze how supplier’s redesign profit (R) affects
buyer’s payment by assuming redesign is costless (Cs = Cb = 0). We start from a
two-supplier example assuming fairly simple distributions in Section 3.4, and then
consider N -supplier case with more general distributions in Section 3.5. Later in
Section 3.6, we incorporate redesign cost (Cs > 0, Cb > 0) to investigate whether
previous insights change if redesign is indeed costly.
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3.4 Effect of Windfall Profit on Bidding Strategies: Case
with Two Suppliers.
We first analyze how the presence of windfall profit affects the suppliers’ bidding
strategies and the buyer’s payment. To build up intuition, we start with a simple
version of the problem: Two suppliers are in the market place where each supplier’s
production cost to complete the initial RFQ, Xi, i = 1, 2, can be either low (xL
with probability s) or high (xH with probability 1 − s). To focus on the impact of
windfall profit, we start with the model where redesign is costless for both buyer and
supplier: Cs = Cb = 0. We also assume that error severity, T , follows a Bernoulli
distribution with P (T = 1) = q, and the associated windfall is R = T × R̄ where
R̄ is a positive constant. This means that with probability q, the RFQ has an error
and the contracted supplier will receive a windfall profit (T = 1 and R = R̄); with
probability 1−q, the RFQ contains no error and the supplier earns no windfall profit.
In an open-bid reverse auction, the price decreases as suppliers continue to un-
dercut each other. Each supplier’s bidding strategy can be captured by his drop-out
price (denoted as β), which is the lowest price the supplier is willing to accept. Conse-
quently, the auction closes when only one supplier stays and the auction price equals
to the second lowest suppliers’ drop-out price.
Auction price = β2:N (= β2:2 when N = 2) (3.1)
where βi:N is the ith smallest bid from N suppliers’ bids.
If the initial RFQ is flawless (T = 0 with probability 1), it can be shown with a
standard argument (see Proposition 2.1 in Krishna (2009)) that a supplier i’s domi-
nant bidding strategy is to set his drop-out price to match his true production cost,
Xi. However, when the RFQ may contain an error (q > 0), this is no longer the case.
In fact, suppliers are strategic and they factor into the potential windfall associated
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with RFQ error when determining their bids. For instance, consider an informed
supplier: When the RFQ is indeed flawed, an informed supplier sees that there will
be additional profit (R̄) after the RFQ error is discovered, and thus is willing to lower
his drop-out price (as much as R̄) to increase his chance of winning the contract; On
the other hand, if there is no error, the informed supplier does not gain from further
lowering his drop-out price. The situation is different for an uninformed buyer: Since
an uninformed buyer cannot predict the error, he cannot adjust his bid the same way
an informed supplier would. The following lemma characterizes the suppliers’ bid-
ding strategies, which can be complicated under different scenarios. The full version
is relegated to Section 3.8.
Lemma 3.1. An informed supplier’s dominant strategy is to bid down to his produc-
tion cost x if the RFQ has no error, and to bid down to x − R̄ when the RFQ has
an error. For uninformed suppliers, an equilibrium exists in which an uninformed
supplier with cost x will bid down to x − E(R) when R̄ ≤ xH − xL, and may deploy
a mixed strategy when R̄ > xH − xL.
Lemma 3.1 highlights the difference between informed and uninformed suppliers.
If the RFQ indeed has an error, an informed supplier will anticipate the extra profit,
R̄, and will lower his drop-out price by the amount of windfall. If the RFQ does not
have an error, he will bid as in the standard auction (where RFQ is perfect as given).
On the other hand, an uninformed supplier cannot predict this additional gain with
certainty, he cannot lower his bid as much as the informed supplier would. When the
windfall profit is small, it is optimal for an uninformed supplier to lower the drop-out
price by the expected windfall E(R) = qR̄. However, this strategy is no longer optimal
when the windfall is large. Consider the case where there is one informed supplier
with high cost and one uninformed supplier with low cost in the market place. When
the error exists, the informed supplier will bid down to xH − R̄. If the uninformed
supplier only bids down to xL − qR̄, then he could lose the contract although he
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has lower cost, since when windfall size is large, informed supplier’s drop-out price
could be lower than that of the uninformed supplier (xH − R̄ < xL − qR̄). Taking
this possibility into account, the uninformed supplier with low cost would bid more
aggressively than just lower the drop-out price by the expected amount of windfall
(See full version of Lemma 3.1 in §3.8 for more details). Similarly, consider the case
where there is one informed supplier with low cost and one uninformed supplier with
high cost. When there is no error, the informed supplier will bid down to xL. If the
uninformed supplier bids down to xH − qR̄, then he could win the contract because
the informed supplier’s drop-out price could be higher than that of the uninformed
supplier (xL > xH − qR̄). However in this case, the uninformed supplier loses money
since the contract price (xL) cannot even cover his cost (xH) and there is no future
compensation. To avoid this situation, the uninformed supplier with high cost should
bid more conservatively.
With suppliers’ bidding strategies provided in Lemma 3.1, we can compute the
buyer’s expected total payment (denoted as Ψ) which includes the contract price
determined by the auction and (possible) redesign windfall payment.
Ψ = E(Auction price + Redesign windfall payment) = E(β2:N) + E(R). (3.2)
To address research question 1, we first analyze how the buyer’s payment Ψ
changes in error severity level T . Because error is associated with windfall pay-
ment, one might expect that the buyer always pays more when the RFQ error is
more severe (which is equivalent to a higher error rate q since T ∼ Bernoulli(q)).
To check whether this intuition is correct, we consider the following example: xL =
1, xH = 2, s = 0.5 and R̄ = 1. Figure 3.2(b) plots buyer’s payment as a function
of the error rate q when fixing informed supplier probability p = 0.5. Surprisingly,




































































































Figure 3.2: Example with parameters xL = 1, xH = 2, s = 0.5 and R̄ = 1. Panel
(a) shows how buyer’s total payment change in error rate q and informed
supplier probability p; Panel (b) shows the slice about how buyer’s total
payment changes in error rate q when fixing informed supplier probabil-
ity p = 0.5; Panel (c) shows the slice about how buyer’s total payment
changes in informed supplier probability p when fixing error rate q = 0.5.
already high (q > 0.5 in this example), lowering the error rate may even result in
a higher payment, because the buyer’s payment includes not only redesign windfall
but also contract price determined via auction. While the expected redesign windfall
payment indeed increases in error rate q, auction price decreases since suppliers bid
more aggressively if they anticipate a higher chance of gaining windfall. It is worth
mentioning that the buyer’s payment decreasing in error rate does not mean the buyer
would intentionally design a flawed RFQ, because here we assume redesign is costless
and high redesign costs (which will be introduced in Section 3.6) make a flawed RFQ
unappealing.
Next we analyze how the buyer’s payment Ψ changes in informed supplier prob-
ability p. Intuitively, informed suppliers can take advantage of their expertise to
squeeze the buyer, so one might expect that the buyer has to pay more with higher
informed supplier probability. However, this intuition is also incorrect. We refer to
the previous example when xL = 1, xH = 2, s = 0.5 and R̄ = 1. Figure 3.2(c) plots
buyer’s payment as a function of the informed supplier probability p when fixing the
error rate q = 0.5. We observe that the buyer’s payment also does not monotonically
increase in informed supplier probability. The underlying reason is suppliers’ com-
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petition: Informed suppliers’ advantage is not against the buyer but rather against
other competing suppliers and therefore windfall profit is competed away (at least
partially).
Furthermore, we observe in Figure 3.2(a) that in the extreme cases when the RFQ
is perfect (q = 0), the RFQ is always flawed (q = 1), all suppliers are uninformed
(p = 0) or all suppliers are informed (p = 1), the buyer has the same lowest expected
total payment.
• When the RFQ is perfect, supplier with production X will bid down to β(X) =
X. The buyer’s expected payment is Ψ|q=0 = E(X2:N).
• When the RFQ is always flawed, both types of suppliers (whether informed or
uninformed) know for sure there will be additional payment R̄, so all will lower
their bids by amount R̄, i.e., β(X) = X− R̄. The contract price is thus lowered
by R̄. The buyer later pays the winning supplier additional R̄ for redesign, so
the buyer’s total payment does not change. Recall Formula (3.2), the buyer’s
expected payment is Ψ|q=1 = E[(X − R̄)2:N ] + R̄ = E(X2:N).
• When all suppliers are uninformed, they value the expected windfall at E(R)
and lower their bids by amount E(R), i.e., β(X) = X − E(R). The contract
payment is lowered by E(R) which cancels out the expected redesign windfall.
The buyer’s expected payment is Ψ|p=0 = E[(X−E(R))2:N ]+E(R) = E(X2:N).
• When all suppliers are informed, they can correctly anticipate the error and
adjust their bids accordingly, i.e., β(X) = X − R. Again the windfall profit
is completely washed away. The buyer’s expected payment is Ψ|p=1 = E[(X −
R)2:N ] + E(R) = E(X2:N).
We are also interested in interior cases when there is a mixture of informed and
uninformed suppliers (0 < p < 1) and uninformed suppliers are not sure whether there
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is error or not (0 < q < 1). Given the fact that an uninformed supplier will lower
his bid even when there is actually no error and the buyer does not pay windfall, one
might wonder whether it is better for the buyer to be in an interior case (0 < p < 1
and 0 < q < 1) rather than the extreme cases (p = 0, p = 1, q = 0 or q = 1).
It is true that the buyer may end up paying less in some sample paths when there
is no error and the auction price is set to some uninformed supplier’s lowered bid.
However, in terms of expected value, the buyer will never be better off in interior
cases, since a rational uninformed supplier will not submit an overly aggressive bid
due to winner’s curse and thus the buyer cannot benefit by uninformed suppliers’
incorrectly foreseeing the windfall profit. We summarize our findings in the following
proposition.
Proposition 3.1. When N = 2, T ∼ Bernoulli(q), and supplier production cost X
follows a two-type distribution, the buyer’s expected total payment Ψ is not monotonic
in error rate q or informed supplier probability p. It has the minimal value Ψo =
E(X2:2) when p = 0, p = 1, q = 0 or q = 1.
3.5 Analysis: N Suppliers with General Cost Distribution
We addressed research question 1 in the last section for the two-supplier case with
simple distributions. In this section, we consider a more general case withN suppliers.
Each supplier’s production cost follows distribution FX which can be any regular
distribution1. Regular distribution is a standard assumption in the auction literature;
examples of it include uniform, normal, logistic and exponential distributions. Error
severity level T follows distribution FT , which no longer only has two states (no error,
error) but can take multiple values with higher values indicating more severe errors
(e.g., no error, small error, medium error, large error). In the previous two-supplier
1In the context of procurement auction, a regular distribution satisfies the condition that x+FX(x)fX(x)
increases in x.
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example, we assumed that the windfall profit R equals to a constant R̄ when RFQ
contains error. We also generalize this assumption by allowing uncertainty even for a
fixed error severity T = t, namely, windfall profit R follows a conditional distribution
FR|T=t. A more severe error is usually associated with higher profit, so we assume
that FR|T=t stochastically increases in t. We continue to focus the analysis on how
supplier’s redesign windfall profit affects the buyer’s payment by assuming redesign
is costless (Cs = Cb = 0); this assumption will be relaxed in Section 3.6.
3.5.1 How RFQ error and supplier expertise affect buyer’s payment
We address research question 1 in the general setting. The key arguments for
the two-supplier example still work. Informed suppliers can foresee future windfall
profit due to RFQ error, and the uninformed suppliers are aware of the possibility
of a windfall profit. Suppliers are strategic; they will price in future profit attached
to the contract. Furthermore, multiple suppliers competing for one contract means
that suppliers might have to give up some profit to win the contract. For example,
imagine one wants to remodel a house. If there is only one contractor to choose, the
house owner may have to pay a high price and pay for change orders down the line.
But if there are multiple competing contractors, each contractor may be willing to
offer a low price quote that takes into account of getting more money in future.
In the context of competing suppliers, a lowered contract price (determined by
suppliers’ competitive bidding) offsets (at least partially) future windfall payment
due to RFQ error. Therefore, naive intuitions about RFQ error does not hold —
an RFQ with higher error severity level does not always result in a higher buyer’s
payment; a supply base with more informed suppliers does not always squeeze more
profit from the buyer. We extend the result in Proposition 3.1 to the general setting.
Theorem 3.1. The buyer’s expected total payment Ψ is not strictly monotonic in
error severity level T or informed supplier probability p. It has the minimal value
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Ψo = E(X2:N) when p = 0, p = 1 or when T is a degenerate random variable.
The error severity level T is a random variable, and we are comparing two error
severity levels by stochastic order. For example, one RFQ has half the chance of
containing an error, T1 ∼ Bernoulli(0.5), and another RFQ always contains an error,
T2 ≡ 1. The first RFQ is less severe than the second RFQ in terms of possibility of
error (T1 < T2). When all else is equal, the buyer pays more for the first RFQ, because
with the second RFQ (T2 ≡ 1), all suppliers know the exact error severity level and
lower their bids by the same amount, canceling out the future windfall payment. Note
that we do not mean a buyer should purposely design a bad RFQ because we have
not consider redesign cost, which will be incorporated in Section 3.6.
One way to prove Theorem 3.1 is to explicitly derive the suppliers’ bidding func-
tions, then compute the buyer’s expected total payment using Formula (3.2), as how
we handled the two-supplier example in Section 3.4. However, this direct approach
is not applicable for the general case here. The suppliers in our model not only have
their own different production costs, but also have different error-detecting expertise
as well. As a consequence of this multidimensional bidder type, closed-form bidding
equilibrium is analytically intractable. Even for the two-supplier example (see full
version of Lemma 3.1 in §3.8), it is already complicated enough when R̄ > xH − xL,
which involves mixed strategy and discrete monetary value space. There are papers
considering multidimensional bidder type, such as Maskin (1992), Pesendorfer and
Swinkels (2000), Jehiel and Moldovanu (2001). As explained in these papers, the
analytical difficulty lies in the fact that unlike one-dimensional space where bidders
can easily be ranked according to their valuations, there is no natural way to rank
bidders in multidimensional space. None of these papers explicitly characterize the
bidding equilibrium for the general case.
To overcome this difficulty, we develop a new, indirect approach to prove the
results without deriving the suppliers’ bidding functions.
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Sketch of Proof
Step 1: We prove that in any extreme cases (p = 0, p = 1 or T is a degenerate random
variable), the buyer’s expected total payment equals Ψo = E(X2:N).
We can prove that any informed supplier’s bidding strategy is to bid down to his
production cost minus the windfall profit he expects on the back end, conditioning
on knowing T = t, i.e., β(X) = X − E(R|T = t). When all suppliers are informed
(p = 1), all adjust their bids by the same amount E(R|T = t), so the auction
price will be lowered by E(R|T = t) which cancels out the expected future windfall
payment E(R|T = t). Recall Formula 3.2, the buyer’s expected total payment is
Ψ|p=1 = E[(X − E(R|T ))2:N ] + E(R) = E(X2:N).
Similarly, when all suppliers are uninformed (p = 0) or when RFQ only has one
severity level (T ≡ t), all suppliers have the same knowledge about the windfall profit.
Every supplier is willing to bid down to his production cost minus the expected future
windfall profit, i.e., β(X) = X−E(R). Thus, the buyer’s payment is Ψ|p=0 = Ψ|T≡t =
E[(X − E(R))2:N ] + E(R) = E(X2:N).
Step 2: We prove that any interior case (0 < p < 1 and T is a non-degenerate random
variable) cannot compete with the extreme cases discussed in Step 1. That is, Ψ ≥ Ψo.
We consider a new model: The RFQ is perfect as given; supplier type is one-
dimensional with only production cost X ∼ FX ; buyer can design any auction mech-
anism. In this new model, according to Myerson (1981), the optimal mechanism2
results in the buyer’s payment equal E(X2:N), which is the same value as in the ex-
treme cases of our model. Since the optimal mechanism results in lower payment
than any feasible mechanism, we need only to design a feasible mechanism for this
new model that has the same payment as in our model. We construct an equivalent
mechanism in the new model:
2The optimal mechanism depends on the assumption that supplier production cost X follows a
regular distribution.
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(i) The buyer generates a random variable T , which follows distribution FT ;
(ii) For each supplier, the buyer flips a coin which has probability p for the head.
If it is the head, let this supplier know the value of T , otherwise, only let him
know the distribution FT ;
(iii) The buyer announces to all suppliers that whoever wins the auction will get an
additional amount R, which follows a conditional distribution FR|T ;
(iv) Suppliers compete in an open-bid reverse auction;
(v) The buyer generates a random variable R which follows distribution FR|T , and
pays the winning supplier an additional amount R above the auction price.
The key point for creating this equivalent mechanism is: The realized values
for error severity, supplier type, and redesign windfall profit, which were previously
decided by nature are controlled by the buyer in the new model; however, the suppliers
in the new model are given the same information as in our model and thus should
follow the same bidding strategies. Therefore, the auction clears at the same price
and the buyer has the same expected total payment in the equivalent mechanism as
in our model.
3.5.2 Pre-paying supplier windfall
Although supplier windfall profit is fully competed away in the extreme cases
(p = 0, p = 1 and T is degenerate), it is not always so in interior cases (0 < p < 1
and T is non-degenerate). We consider research question 2 and analyze if there is a
way the buyer can completely remove supplier windfall profit.
To answer this question, we first analyze the extreme cases to see why windfall
profit can be fully competed away. We find the extreme cases have something in
common: All suppliers have the same level of anticipation regarding to the future
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windfall profit — either the suppliers have the same capability of detecting the error
severity (p = 0 or p = 1), or the error severity has no uncertainty (T is degenerate).
Based on this observation, we are wondering whether there exists a way to “mimic”
the extreme cases — equalize the levels of anticipation for windfall profit between
uninformed and informed suppliers.
Our base model is actually a contingent contract since supplier’s windfall profit
is paid after the error is discovered and depends on the error severity level. Because
informed suppliers and uninformed suppliers have different knowledge about the error
severity level, and thus have different anticipations for windfall profit, the windfall
profit is not always competed away.
Next we propose an alternative contract called “pre-pay” and show how a pre-pay
contract levels suppliers’ anticipation for windfall profit. We define R̄ as the maximal
possible value of windfall R that a buyer can ever get for any error severity level.
Before holding the auction, the buyer announces to all suppliers that the contract
winner will be paid an additional payment R̄ as compensation for potential design
flaws, regardless of the RFQ error severity. We call this new contract “pre-pay”
because the additional amount is paid to the auction winner immediately after the
auction is closed and before any RFQ error is discovered. That is, even if it turns
out that redesign is unnecessary or the error is minor and easy to fix, the supplier
keeps the pre-paid amount. When redesign does occur, the supplier cannot ask for
more compensation since the maximal possible profit R̄ is already paid to cover this
uncertainty. With a pre-pay contract, the winning supplier gets a guaranteed payment
R̄ that is not contingent on the presence or the size of RFQ error. Therefore, both
informed and uninformed suppliers have the exact same anticipation for windfall profit
— the winning supplier is guaranteed a fixed amount, R̄.
We choose R̄ as the pre-paid amount for two reasons. First, since R̄ is the maximal
possible amount a supplier can get from redesign, after the buyer pre-pays R̄, the
71
supplier has no excuse to ask for more profit later. Second, although we model
the cases where the buyer decides the contract type, in practice suppliers may also
participate in determining the contract type, especially if the buyer wants to switch
from a traditional contingent contract to a new pre-pay contract. Since a guaranteed
amount of R̄ is obviously better than the possibility of getting profit R(≤ R̄), even if
a supplier can choose his own contract type, he will choose a pre-pay contract over a
contingent contract.
The pre-pay contract may seem harmful for the buyer at first glance, because
he must pay the maximal possible windfall amount regardless of the existence or
severity of the RFQ error. However, this intuition is incorrect; the pre-paid amount
eventually will be competed away. We support this argument by considering the
supplier’s bidding strategy. Since the contract comes with a guaranteed additional
value R̄, suppliers will price in this value and lower their bids by R̄. Hence the
auction price is lowered by amount R̄ which completely cancels out the pre-paid
amount. What is interesting and seemingly paradoxical about this pre-pay idea is
that by committing to pay windfall profit, the buyer eventually removes the suppliers’
capability of gaining any windfall. We formalize the result in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2. Let Ψpp be the buyer’s expected total payment with the pre-pay con-
tract. It is always lower than that with the contingent contract. For any 0 ≤ p ≤ 1,
any distribution FT and FR|T , and any regular distribution FX , Ψ
pp = E(X2:N) ≤ Ψ.
It is worth mentioning that pre-pay is effective only in the context of competing
suppliers, and re-arranging the payment alone does not solve the problem. If there
is only one supplier, pre-pay actually penalizes the buyer. Only when competition
exists, suppliers have to give away the profit associated with redesign and this is when
the buyer benefits from pre-pay.
We also want to point out that pre-pay is not meant to squeeze the supplier too
hard, but rather to prevent the supplier from extracting too much windfall profit out
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of redesign. The supplier still receives profit from finishing the requirement on the
RFQ (with production cost X1:N , which is smaller than auction price X2:N). As for
the profit associated with redesign, the supplier is willing to compete it away in order
to win the contract. Recall that even with a traditional contingent contract, when
all suppliers are equally informed or uninformed, the profit associated with redesign
is also competed away.
Example
Suppose a homeowner wants to remodel her kitchen and lists the requirements
on the RFQ. There are two contractors whose costs of completing the work are x1 =
$10, 000 and x2 = $12, 000. If the RFQ is perfect and there is no change order, then
the contract will be given to contractor 1 with price max(x1, x2) = $12, 000.
Suppose the buyer knows that the RFQ is not perfect and asks the contractors
how much change orders might run. The contractors says the change order fee R
(on top of costs, since for now we assume redesign is costless) can range from $500
to $4,000 depending on the severity. Of course, the contractors tend to give a wide
range just to cover themselves.
The buyer can sign a pre-pay contract with the contract winner and pay him an
extra $4,000 up-front to cover all possible change orders. Of course, the contractor
needs to promise to complete the necessary change orders without asking for more
profit later. The contractors would accept this pre-pay contract since a guaranteed
$4,000 dominates a possible amount between $500 and $4,000.
The two contractors compete for the contract. Since the contract comes with an
extra value of $4,000, each contractor is willing to bid down to his true production
cost minus this extra value. That is, contractor 1 bids down to β1 = x1− R̄ = $6, 000
and contractor 2 bids down to β2 = x2 − R̄ = $8, 000, so the contract will be given
to contractor 1 with price max(β1, β2) = $8, 000. Then the buyer pays contractor 1
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an additional amount $4,000, and thus the buyer’s total payment is $12,000 which is
the same payment as if there is no error in RFQ.
3.6 Incorporating Redesign Cost
So far we have discussed how supplier redesign profit affects the buyer’s payment
and how a pre-pay contract eliminates the supplier’s redesign profit. But we have not
considered the additional costs associated with redesign yet, and this is what we are
going to discuss in this section.
Redesign can be costly for the supplier, because he needs to adapt the production
procedure and may incur additional overhead cost, material cost, labor cost and
opportunity cost by taking this extra work. Redesign can also be very costly for the
buyer. For example, if the RFQ is for some part of a new product, redesign may
delay the product launch date. Things get even worse if the buyer discovers the error
after the new product has been launched to the market, for the buyer needs to recall
the product and incurs a huge loss of goodwill. In the USPS/Northrop example,
Northrop incurred the cost of $179 million to compensate for all change orders, and
USPS incurred the cost of $394 million for losses caused by retesting and late delivery
(Federal Times , 2012). In the house remodel example, the supplier redesign cost is
the contractor’s cost of paying sub-contractors, hiring a plumber expert, and extra
material costs, and the buyer’s redesign cost is the disruption and displacement costs
of having the house wall torn up for more time. To capture these practical concerns,
we incorporate the supplier’s redesign cost Cs and the buyer’s redesign cost Cb. The
redesign costs Cs and Cb depend on the severity T , and follow conditional distributions
FCs|T and FCb|T , respectively. Since a more severe error usually is more expensive
to fix, we assume FCs|T and FCb|T increase in T . In the event of redesign (which
is consequent to the buyer making an error), the buyer reimburses the supplier’s
redesign cost Cs besides windfall payment R.
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3.6.1 How RFQ error and supplier expertise affect buyer’s payment
We consider the contingent contract where the buyer pays the supplier redesign
cost and redesign windfall profit contingent on the existence and size of RFQ error.
Since we incorporate redesign costs, the buyer’s expected total payment (denoted as
ΨG) should be
ΨG = E(Auction price+Redesign profit+Redesign cost) = E(β2:N)+E(R)+E(Cs+Cb).
From a supplier’s perspective, redesign cost Cs is a contingent cost and will be
reimbursed by the buyer anyway, so the amount Cs should not affect his bidding
strategy. In fact, suppliers will submit the same bid as if there is no redesign cost, so
the auction price is the same as in the case Cs = 0.
From the buyer’s perspective, in the event of redesign, she has to reimburse the
supplier’s redesign cost Cs and also incurs redesign cost Cb to herself, so the buyer’s
expected total payment is increased by the amount of expected redesign cost, E(Cs+
Cb), compared to the case where redesign is costless (discussed in Section 3.5). That
is, the buyer’s total payment including redesign costs is
ΨG = Ψ+ E(Cs + Cb), (3.3)
in which Ψ is the buyer’s payment assuming redesign is costless.
The property of Ψ has been analyzed in Theorem 3.1, and E(Cs+Cb) increases in
T since a more severe error is usually more difficult to fix. Based on this relationship,
Theorem 3.1 can be extended.
Theorem. 3.1-G. The buyer’s expected total payment ΨG is not monotonic in p.
For p = 0, p = 1 or degenerate T , ΨG = E(Cs + Cb) + Ψo; For any 0 < p < 1 and
non-degenerate T , ΨG ≥ E(Cs + Cb) + Ψo, where Ψo = E(X2:N).
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Based on Formula (3.3) and redesign costs being independent in informed supplier
probability p, the buyer’s payment is still not monotonic in p. The naive intuition
that the buyer should avoid having many informed suppliers who can take advantage
of their expertise is also incorrect. Actually, a supply base with all informed suppliers
results in the same payment as a supply base with all uninformed suppliers, and a
mixed supply base (consisting of both informed and uninformed suppliers) results in
a higher payment for the buyer.
However, whether the buyer’s payment is monotonic in error severity level T
depends on the magnitude of redesign cost Cs +Cb. When Cs +Cb is high, the effect
of high redesign cost dominates the benefit of suppliers bidding aggressively, so the
buyer’s payment does increase in error severity level T . In this case, the buyer should
consider improving design expertise, such as rehiring engineering staff or hiring an
outside expert to vet RFQ specifications.
Again, in the extreme cases when suppliers have the same anticipate for future
windfall — either all suppliers have the same error-detecting capability (p = 0 or
p = 1) or the error severity has no uncertainty (T is degenerate), the redesign windfall
is completely washed away through suppliers’ competition.
3.6.2 Pre-paying supplier windfall
Next we analyze how to remove supplier windfall profit when redesign is costly. We
assume that supplier’s redesign cost is perfectly verifiable in Section 3.6.2 and 3.6.3.
In practice, buyers require suppliers report cost information related to redesign. Sup-
pliers cannot ask for an arbitrarily high amount of money, but have to justify their
request. For example, this reflects what happens in government contracting. Gov-
ernment requires suppliers to submit equitable adjustment documentation stating all
costs associated with redesign; any misrepresentation in the actual costs is illegal.
When redesign cost is verifiable, we propose a slightly altered pre-pay which can
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remove supplier windfall completely: The buyer pre-pays the maximal amount of
windfall R̄ but keeps supplier redesign cost Cs as a contingent payment. That is, the
contracted supplier is guaranteed to receive the maximal amount windfall R̄, but the
cost is reimbursed later to the actual amount associated with redesign. The contingent
payment Cs does not affect suppliers’ bidding strategy since it is reimbursed by the
exact amount anyway. As for the pre-paid amount R̄, similar to the earlier model, all
suppliers will lower bid by the amount R̄, lowering the auction price and canceling
out the pre-paid amount.
This altered pre-pay is as effective as the pre-pay strategy introduced in Sec-
tion 3.5.2 in removing supplier redesign windfall profit, but the buyer still has to pay
redesign cost. If we use ΨppG to denote buyer’s expected total payment incorporat-
ing redesign cost (recall that Ψpp is buyer’s payment with pre-pay when redesign is
costless), we have the following relationship:
ΨppG = Ψ
pp + E(Cs + Cb).
Therefore, Theorem 3.2 can be extended.
Theorem. 3.2-G. When the buyer pre-pays R̄ and keeps Cs as a contingent payment,
the buyer’s expected total payment is always lower than that with the contingent con-
tract. Actually, ΨppG = E(Cs + Cb) + Ψo ≤ ΨG.
3.6.3 Extract knowledge from informed suppliers
While the buyer can remove windfall profit completely utilizing a pre-pay con-
tract, she still has to pay redesign costs. Therefore, the buyer has an incentive to
discover the error earlier and avoid redesign, especially when redesign is expensive
(e.g. recalling a flawed product hurts the brand image). Because the buyer no longer
retains production expertise, it is difficult for her to design a perfect RFQ or detect
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Figure 3.3: Error-bounty approach when the supplier’s redesign cost is verifiable
the error in a flawed RFQ. She may rehire engineering staff or hire outside expert
to vet RFQ specifications, but those options are expensive. However, the informed
suppliers are experts in detecting RFQ error. Now we address research question 3:
Can the buyer leverage suppliers’ error-detecting expertise to preempt RFQ error?
Recall that with a pre-pay contract, suppliers compete away the redesign windfall
profit. Since any informed supplier cannot make a profit from RFQ error, he has no
incentive to hide the information. Therefore, the buyer can offer a nominal “error-
bounty” to induce an informed supplier to report the RFQ error essentially for free.
Figure 3.3 shows the steps to implement the error-bounty approach with a pre-pay
contract.
If a supplier reports the existence of RFQ error, the buyer can correct it and
reissue a new perfect RFQ. In this case, the buyer uses a normal contract and the
contract price is determined by the suppliers’ competition. When no one reports the
error and the RFQ is still possibly flawed, the buyer uses a pre-pay contract. One may
wonder why a supplier would report the error for a small bounty that eliminates the
guaranteed pre-paid amount R̄. The reason is with a pre-pay contract, the supplier
does not actually receive any profit due to competition. The bounty, however small,
is actual money that a supplier can receive. Therefore, an informed supplier foregoes
the pre-pay amount (it does not translate into money in his pocket) but chooses to
report the error to get the bounty (which is money in his pocket).
However, when all suppliers are uninformed (with probability (1−p)N), no supplier
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can detect the error and the buyer has to pay the inevitable redesign costs (Cs +Cb)
when RFQ contains an error. We formalize our finding in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.3. In the context of a pre-pay contract, the buyer can pick an arbitrarily
small bounty, offer it to the first supplier who shows that the RFQ is flawed, and
correct the RFQ before holding an auction. Then the buyer’s expected total payment
will be Ψ̂ppG = (1− p)NE(Cs + Cb) + Ψo ≤ Ψ
pp
G .
Theoretically any arbitrarily small bounty would be enough to induce an informed
supplier to report RFQ error. In reality, the bounty should not be just one penny
but need to be large enough to act as an incentive. Nevertheless, the bounty is a
negligible amount compared to the size of the entire contract.
By offering an error-bounty with a pre-pay contract, the buyer can leverage sup-
pliers’ superior knowledge and at the same time avoid paying windfall profit or re-
imbursing redesign costs. Actually, this creates a win-win solution for both parties:
The supplier can receive a bounty and the buyer can avoid the pain of redesign.
Consequently, the entire supply chain becomes more efficient.
3.6.4 Supplier’s redesign cost is not perfectly verifiable
Our analysis in Section 3.6.2 and 3.6.3 is based on the assumption that supplier
redesign cost is perfectly verifiable. However, sometimes the cost is fuzzy and suppliers
might potentially lie about the redesign cost. For example, suppose redesign requires
extra labor time from the supplier, he may report 200 hours while it actually costs
him 190 hours; the labor cost of 10 hours is the profit that a supplier gets from lying
about the actual redesign cost. To capture this, we still let Cs be the actual redesign
cost, but write R = Rl +Ra where Rl is the profit from lying and Ra is the mutually
agreed profit when redesign happens.
This new structure of redesign profit does not change our answer to research
question 1 about how the RFQ error and informed supplier probability affect the
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Figure 3.4: Error-bounty approach when the supplier’s redesign cost is not verifiable
buyer’s payment, i.e., Theorem 3.1-G still holds, because the suppliers still price in
windfall profit R and bid aggressively to win the contract.
As for research question 2 (how to remove supplier windfall profit from RFQ
error), the buyer can remove the agreed windfall payment (Ra) by pre-paying the
maximal amount of agreed windfall R̄a. All suppliers lower their bids by R̄a and the
auction price is lowered which cancels out the pre-paid amount completely. However,
supplier’s profit from lying (Rl) cannot be avoided through pre-pay, because even if
the buyer pre-pays the maximal profit a supplier can get from lying, the supplier can
still “lie” about his true redesign cost.
To address this issue and answer research question 3 (how to leverage supplier
expertise to preempt RFQ error), we use an altered error-bounty approach: The
buyer uses the maximum amount of Rl (denoted as R̄l) as a bounty for suppliers to
report RFQ error. With this incentive, any informed supplier prefers reporting the
error (receiving bounty R̄l) to hiding the error (getting a profit less than Rl since part
of Rl will be competed away). The size of the bounty (R̄l) depends on how much a
supplier can lie about his redesign cost, which is usually small relative to the actual
redesign cost. Hence, by using pre-pay and error-bounty, the buyer avoids paying
redesign costs (Cs +Cb), avoids paying windfall profit (Ra +Rl), and only has to pay
a relatively small amount that cannot be ex post verified (R̄l). Figure 3.4 shows the
steps to implement the error-bounty approach with pre-pay contract when redesign
cost is not verifiable.
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3.7 Conclusions
While most procurement research assumes that a buyer’s RFQ is perfect as given,
in reality the RFQ can be flawed due to errors of omission and misspecification. This
makes the buyer vulnerable to expensive future change orders during the life of the
contract. However, experienced suppliers may be more knowledgeable than the buyer
and possess the knowledge to recognize errors and anticipate windfall profit at the
time of bidding. We model the case where the buyer is prone to making an error in
the initial RFQ (accompanied by future redesign and supplier windfall), which in turn
may or may not be detected by each supplier depending on each supplier’s expertise.
To address research question 1, we first analyze how a buyer’s payment changes
with the severity of the RFQ error. Although intuitively one might expect that a
more severe error would always increase the buyer’s payment because the buyer has
to pay a higher redesign payment, we find this intuition is not always correct. The
reason behind this is that while the redesign payment indeed increases, the auction
price decreases because suppliers compete more aggressively to secure the contract if
they anticipate higher future windfall profit.
We then analyze how the buyer’s payment changes with the probability of in-
formed suppliers who can detect the RFQ error. One might expect that a higher
informed supplier probability hurts the buyer since it means there are more informed
suppliers who can take advantage of their expertise to squeeze the buyer. Again, this
intuition is also incorrect. A supply base with all informed suppliers will result in the
same payment as that of a supply base with all uninformed suppliers, because, while
informed suppliers are more knowledgeable, they still need to compete against each
other and their information advantage is against other suppliers rather than against
the buyer. The managerial takeaway is that supplier disparity does not benefit the
buyer. When the buyer designs a supply base, she should choose either all informed
suppliers or all uninformed suppliers. In a mixed supply base consisting of both
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informed and uninformed suppliers, windfall is not washed away completely.
Addressing research question 2 (how to remove supplier redesign windfall profit),
we propose a creative approach called “pre-pay”. By pre-paying the maximum pos-
sible windfall, the buyer can stem any windfall payment. It benefits the buyer by
equalizing suppliers’ anticipation for redesign windfall, since all suppliers will lower
their bids by the exact pre-paid amount and the lowered auction price cancels out
the pre-paid amount.
Furthermore, we address research question 3 (how to leverage supplier expertise
to preempt RFQ error). Since pre-pay removes the possibility for suppliers to benefit
from redesign, suppliers have no incentive to hide information about the error in the
initial RFQ. By offering a bounty, the buyer can induce the informed suppliers to
reveal their information. This creates a win-win situation for both the buyer and the
suppliers, since both will be better off by avoiding redesign. Through the approach of
pre-pay and error-bounty, the buyer creates a reciprocal environment where the buyer
and suppliers have incentive to communicate and share expertise. Consequently, the
entire supply chain becomes more efficient.
Our model allows the redesign cost and windfall profit to be correlated since they
both depend on error severity level. In addition, our results also go through if the
redesign cost and supplier production cost are positively correlated. For example, a
supplier with low production cost tends to have low redesign cost. Suppose supplier
i’s redesign cost is Cs(Xi, θi) where θi is a commonly distributed random term, and
suppose xi ≤ xj implies that E[Cs(xi, θi)] ≤ E[Cs(xj, θj)]. This assumption assures
that, if the buyer awards the contract to the supplier with lowest production cost, this
supplier is also the one with lowest expected redesign cost. This allows us to conclude
that regardless of the existence of the RFQ error, the buyer’s decision for contract
allocation will not change (but her total payment would be inflated by the redesign
cost). We extend Theorem 3.1-G, 3.2-G and 3.3 by replacing Cs with Cs(X1:N , θ).
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We consider open-bid reverse auction in our model because it is commonly used
in practice. However, all our results can directly apply to other auction mechanisms
such as first-price sealed-bid auction, Vickrey auction, Dutch auction, or optimal
mechanism. This is because when suppliers have the same cost distribution, all
those auctions are equivalent resulting in the same expected buyer payment (see
Proposition 3.1 in Krishna (2009)). Therefore, the indirect approach we use to prove
Theorem 3.1 goes through even with other auction formats and other theorems also
hold accordingly.
To our best knowledge, this paper is the first in operations to consider the practical
case that the buyer’s RFQ can be misspecified, as well as the fact that experienced
suppliers can be more knowledgeable than the buyer, and the buyer can leverage
suppliers’ knowledge. Analyzing the problem is challenging, and we use a problem
transformation method applying optimal mechanism design to prove results about
common auction formats. This paper has potential to help procurement managers
make decisions about improving expertise in RFQ and designing the supply base.
This paper also provides an alternative strategy to make the entire supply chain more
efficient. We hope it can spur more research into this important yet under-studied
area about error-prone RFQs.
3.8 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 3.1
Lemma. 3.1. An informed supplier with production cost X = x has a dominant
bidding strategy: biding down to x − R̄ when RFQ is flawed and biding down to x
otherwise.
When p = 0, q = 0 or q = 1, an uninformed supplier with production cost X = x
will bid down to x − qR̄; when 0 < p < 1, 0 < q < 1, an uninformed supplier has a
83
symmetric equilibrium: Set R̃ = R̄
xH−xL
;
1. If X = xL, then
(a) when R̃ < 1
1−q , bid down to βL = xL − qR̄;
(b) when 1




1−q , bid down to βL = xH − R̄− ϵ
3;
(c) when R̃ ≥ (1−s)pq
s(1−p)(1−q)+
1
1−q , follow a mixed strategy: Set αL =
(1−s)pq
s(1−p)((1−q)R̃−1) ,
bid down to βL = xH−R̄ with probability αL and bid down to βL = xL−qR̄
with probability 1− αL.
2. If X = xH , then
(a) when R̃ < 1
q
, bid down to βH = xH − qR̄;
(b) when 1
q




, bid down to βH = xL + ϵ
′;




, follow a mixed strategy: Set αH =
sp(1−q)
(1−s)(1−p)(qR̃−1) ,
bid down to βH = xL with probability αH and bid down to βH = xH − qR̄
with probability 1− αH .
Proof: Suppose supplier 2 follows the strategy described in Lemma 3.1. We will
argue that it is optimal for supplier 1 to also follow the strategy described in the
lemma.
We can easily verify that βL ≤ xL − qR̄ < xH − qR̄ ≤ βH .
1. When supplier 1 is uninformed and with low cost X1 = xL, the expected
3Here we consider possible bids in discrete space. Assume in 1(b), xH − R − ϵ is the closest
bid lower than xH − R; in 2(b), xL + ϵ′ is the closest bid higher than xL. Otherwise, there is no
equilibrium in continuous space either for the case 1(b) or 2(b).
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payment for supplier 1 to bid down to b is
ΠL(b) =pEX2 [q(X2 − R̄− xL + R̄)(Ib<X2−R̄ + 0.5Ib=X2−R̄)
+ (1− q)(X2 − xL)(Ib<X2 + 0.5Ib=X2)]
+ (1− p)sEβL [(βL − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βL + 0.5Ib=βL)]
+ (1− p)(1− s)EβH [(βH − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )]
=p(1− s)[q(xH − xL)(Ib<xH−R + 0.5Ib=xH−R̄)
+ (1− q)(xH − xL)(Ib<xH + 0.5Ib=xH )]
+ (1− p)sEβL [(βL − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βL + 0.5Ib=βL)]
+ (1− p)(1− s)EβH [(βH − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )]
=(1− s)p(1− q)(xH − xL)(Ib<xH + 0.5Ib=xH )
+ (1− s)(1− p)EβH [(βH − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )]
+ (1− s)pq(xH − xL)(Ib<xH−R + 0.5Ib=xH−R̄)
+ s(1− p)EβL [(βL − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βL + 0.5Ib=βL)]
=Υ1(b) + Υ2(b) + Υ3(b)
Here, we define Υ1(b) = (1 − s)p(1 − q)(xH − xL)(Ib<xH + 0.5Ib=xH ) + (1 − s)(1 −
p)EβH [(βH − xL + qR̄)(Ib<βH +0.5Ib=βH )]. Since βH > xL − qR, any b < min(xH , βH)
maximize Υ1(b). And Υ2(b) = (1−s)pq(xH−xL)(Ib<xH−R̄+0.5Ib=xH−R̄) is maximized
by any b < xH−R̄, Υ3(b) = s(1−p)EβL [(βL−xL+qR̄)(Ib<βL+0.5Ib=βL)] is maximized
by b = xL − qR̄.
(a) When R̃ < 1
1−q , i.e, xL−qR̄ < xH−R̄, b = xL−qR̄maximizes Υ1(b),Υ2(b),Υ3(b)
and thus maximizes ΠL(b) = Υ1(b) + Υ2(b) + Υ3(b).
(b) Set A = (1 − s)pq(xH − xL), B(t) = s(1 − p)(xL − qR̄ − t). B(t) is strictly
decreasing in t. When 1




1−q , we have xH − R̄ ≤ xL −
qR̄, B(xH − R̄) ≥ 0, A > B(xH − R̄). Since βL = xH − R̄ − ϵ, when ϵ is small
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enough, A > B(βL) > 0.
Υ2(b) + Υ3(b) =

A−B(βL) if b < βL
A− 0.5B(βL) if b = βL
0.5A if b = xH − R̄
0 if b > xH − R̄
Since βL is the highest possible bid lower than xH − R̄, the above equation has
considered all possible bids. We can see that b = βL maximize Υ2(b) + Υ3(b),
and it also maximize Υ1(b) since βL < xH − R̄ ≤ xH −qR̄ ≤ min(xH , βH). Thus
b = βL maximizes ΠL(b).
(c) When R̃ ≥ (1−s)pq
s(1−p)(1−q) +
1
1−q , we have xH − R̄ ≤ xL − qR̄, B(xH − R̄) ≥ 0, A ≤
B(xH − R̄). As described in the lemma, αL = AB(xH−R̄) .
Υ2(b) + Υ3(b) =

A− αLB(xH − R̄) = 0 if b < xH − R̄
0.5A− 0.5αLB(xH − R̄) = 0 if b = xH − R̄
0 if b > xH − R̄
For any b, Υ2(b) + Υ3(b) = 0. Since xH − R̄ ≤ xL − qR̄ < min(xH , βH), the
mixed strategy described in 1(c) also maximize Υ1(b). Thus βL is the optimal
bidding strategy.
2. Similarly, when supplier 1 is uninformed and with high cost X1 = xH , the
86
expected payment for supplier 1 to bid down to b is
ΠH(b) =pEX2 [q(X2 − R̄− xH + R̄)(Ib<X2−R̄ + 0.5Ib=X2−R̄)
+ (1− q)(X2 − xH)(Ib<X2 + 0.5Ib=X2)]
+ (1− p)sEβL [(βL − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βL + 0.5Ib=βL)]
+ (1− p)(1− s)EβH [(βH − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )]
=pr[−q(xH − xL)(Ib<xL−R̄ + 0.5Ib=xL−R̄)
− (1− q)(xH − xL)(Ib<xL + 0.5Ib=xL)]
+ (1− p)sEβL [(βL − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βL + 0.5Ib=βL)]
+ (1− p)(1− s)EβH [(βH − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )]
=− spq(xH − xL)(Ib<xL−R̄ + 0.5Ib=xL−R̄)
+ s(1− p)EβL [(βL − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βL + 0.5Ib=βL)
− sp(1− q)(xH − xL)(Ib<xL + 0.5Ib=xL)
+ (1− s)(1− p)EβH [(βH − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )]
=Γ1(b) + Γ2(b) + Γ3(b)
Here, we define Γ1(b) = −spq(xH − xL)(Ib<xL−R̄ + 0.5Ib=xL−R̄) + s(1 − p)EβL [(βL −
xH + qR̄)(Ib<βL +0.5Ib=βL). Since βL < xH − qR̄, any b > max(xL − R̄, βL) maximize
Γ1(b). And Γ2(b) = −sp(1 − q)(xH − xL)(Ib<xL + 0.5Ib=xL) is maximized by any
b > xL, Γ3(b) = (1 − s)(1 − p)EβH [(βH − xH + qR̄)(Ib<βH + 0.5Ib=βH )] is maximized
by b = xH − qR̄.
(a) When R̃ < 1
q
, i.e, xH − qR̄ > xL, b = xH − qR̄ maximizes Γ1(b),Γ2(b),Γ3(b) and
thus maximizes ΠH(b) = Γ1(b) + Γ2(b) + Γ3(b).
(b) Set C = sp(1−q)(xH−xL), D(t) = (1−s)(1−p)(t−(xH−qR̄)). D(t) is strictly
increasing in t. When 1
q




, we have xH − qR̄ ≤ xL, D(xL) ≥
0, C > D(xL). Since βH = xL + ϵ
′, when ϵ′ is small enough, C > D(βH) > 0.
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Γ2(b) + Γ3(b) =

D(βH)− C if b < xL
D(βH)− 0.5C if b = xL
0.5D(βH) if b = βH
0 if b > βH
Since βH is the lowest possible bid higher than xL, the above equation has
considered all possible bids. We can see that b = βH maximize Υ2(b) + Υ3(b),
and it also maximize Γ1(b) since βH > xL ≥ max(xL − R̄, βL). Thus b = βH
maximizes ΠH(b).




, we have xH − qR̄ ≤ xL, D(xL) ≥ 0, C ≤ D(xL). As




Γ2(b) + Γ3(b) =

−C + αHD(xL) = 0 if b < xL
−0.5C + 0.5αHD(xL) = 0 if b = xL
0 if b > xL
For any b, Γ2(b) + Γ3(b) = 0. Since xL ≥ xH − qR̄ > max(xL − R̄, βL), the
mixed strategy described in 1(c) also maximize Γ1(b). Thus βH is the optimal
bidding strategy.
Proof of Proposition 3.1
It is easy to verify that when q = 0 or q = 1 or p = 0 or p = 1, the buyer’s
expected total payment equals to Ψ0 = E[max(X1, X2)]. Next, we will prove that for
any fixed p (0 < p < 1), the buyer’s expected total payment Ψ(q) satisfies Ψ(q) ≥ Ψo.
For simplicity, we let xL = 0, xH = 1 and hence R̄ = R̃. This will not affect our
analysis, because if we view the expected payment as a function Φ(xL, xH), then
Φ(xL, xH) = xL + (xH − xL)Φ(0, 1).
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Suppose an uninformed supplier with production cost X will bid β(X). We can
write the buyer’s expected total payment as
Ψ(q) =p2E[max(X1, X2)] + (1− p)2(E[max(β(X1), β(X2))] + qR̄)
+ 2p(1− p)(q(E[max(X1 − R̄, β(X2))] + R̄) + (1− q)E[max(X1, β(X2))])
=p2Ψ0 + (1− p2)qR̄ + (1− p)2E[max(β(X1), β(X2))]
+ 2p(1− p)(qE[max(X1 − R̄, β(X2))] + (1− q)E[max(X1, β(X2))])
For any 0 < p < 1, 0 < q < 1, according to the bidding strategy described in Lemma
3.1 4, we have:
• When X1 < X2, max(β(X1), β(X2)) = β(X2), so
E[max(β(X1), β(X2))] =2s(1− s)E(βH) + s2E[max(βL, β′L)]
+ (1− s)2E[max(βH , β′H)];
• When X1 ≤ X2, max(X1 − R̄, β(X2)) = β(X2), so
E[max(X1− R̄, β(X2))] = (1− s)E(βH)+ s2E(βL)+ s(1− s)E[max(1− R̄, βL)];
• When X1 ≥ X2, max(X1, β(X2)) = X1, so
E[max(X1, β(X2))] = (1− s) + s(1− s)E[max(0, βH)].
4In cases 1(b) and 2(b), we use βL = xH − R̄ and βH = xL instead. When ϵ and ϵ′ are sufficiently
small, Ψ(p, q) calculated below will be accurate enough to show the buyer’s expected payment.
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Hence, we can rewrite the buyer’s expected total payment
Ψ(q) =p2Ψ0 + (1− p2)qR̄
+ (1− p)2(2s(1− s)E(βH) + s2E[max(βL, β′L)] + (1− s)2E[max(βH , β′H)])
+ 2p(1− p)q((1− s)E(βH) + s2E(βL) + s(1− s)E[max(1− R̄, βL)])
+ 2p(1− p)(1− q)((1− s) + s(1− s)E[max(0, βH)])
=p2Ψ0 + (1− p2)qR̄ + 2(1− s)p(1− p)(1− q)
+ 2s2p(1− p)qE(βL) + 2s(1− s)p(1− p)qE[max(1− R̄, βL)])
+ s2(1− p)2E[max(βL, β′L)] + 2(1− s)(1− p)(s(1− p) + pq)E(βH)
+ 2s(1− s)p(1− p)(1− q)E[max(0, βH)] + (1− s)2(1− p)2E[max(βH , β′H)]
=Co(p, q) + CL(p, q) + CH(p, q)
Here,
Co(p, q) =p
2Ψ0 + (1− p2)qR̄ + 2(1− s)p(1− p)(1− q)
CL(p, q) =2s
2p(1− p)qE(βL) + 2s(1− s)p(1− p)qE[max(1− R̄, βL)]
+ s2(1− p)2E[max(βL, β′L)]
CH(p, q) =2(1− s)(1− p)(s(1− p) + pq)E(βH)
+ 2s(1− s)p(1− p)(1− q)E[max(0, βH)]
+ (1− s)2(1− p)2E[max(βH , β′H)].
We now analyze CL. Since CL is continuous in q and differentiable in q almost
everywhere (actually, CL has at most two non-differentiable points), we consider the
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first order and second order derivatives in the differentiable points.
∂CL(p, q)
∂q
=2s2p(1− p)E(βL) + 2s(1− s)p(1− p)E[max(1− R̄, βL)]






















+ 2s(1− s)p(1− p)q∂
2E[max(1− R̄, βL)]
∂q2
We define ΩaL = {q : R̄ < 11−q},Ω
b















αL(1− R̄) + (1− αL)(−qR̄) ΩcL











α2L(1− R̄) + (1− α2L)(−qR̄) ΩcL
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L. When R̄ ≤ 1, ΩaL = {q : q ∈
(0, 1)},ΩbL = ∅ and ΩcL = ∅, so CL is concave in q for any 0 < q < 1. When




L = {q :
s(1−p)(R̄−1)











Similarly for CH . When R̄ ≤ 1, CH is concave in q for any 0 < q < 1. When
R̄ > 1, we define ΩaH = {q : q < 1R̄}, Ω
b




H = {q :
q ≥ sp+(1−s)(1−p)











Since Co is linear in q, Ψ = Co + CL + CH is concave in q ∈ ΩwL ∩ ΩvH for any
w, v ∈ {a, b, c}. When R̄ ≤ 1, ΩaL = {q : q ∈ (0, 1)},ΩaH = {q : q ∈ (0, 1)}, so Ψ is
concave in q for any 0 < q < 1. Therefore, Ψ get the minimal value either at q = 0 or
q = 1. Since Ψ(0) = Ψ(1) = Ψo, Ψ(q) has the minimal value Ψo. When R̄ > 1, Ψ has
4 possible non-differentiable points. We can verify that for each non-differentiable
points Ψ(qi) > Ψo, i = 1, 2, 3, 4. Also because Ψ(q) is concave in q ∈ ΩwL ∩ ΩvH for
any w, v ∈ {a, b, c}, Ψ(q) ≥ Ψo for any q.
Proof of Theorem 3.1
The 2-step proof is given in Section 3.5. Here I will just prove the supplier’s
bidding strategies in extreme cases as shown in Step 1.
When all suppliers are uninformed (p = 0), suppose we want to solve for supplier
i’s bidding strategy. Since no supplier can detect the error severity T , suppliers’ bids
do not depend on T . We let y−i denote the highest bid of the other N − 1 suppliers.
Suppose supplier i has production costXi = xi and bids bi. Then supplier i’s expected
payoff is E[I{bi<y−i}(y−i − xi + R)] = I{bi<y−i}[y−i − (xi − E(R))]. To maximize this
expected payoff, we should have bi < y−i if y−i − (xi − E(R)) > 0 and bi > y−i is
y−i − (xi − E(R)) < 0. Therefore, one dominant strategy is to bid bi = xi − E(R).
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Hence, the buyer’s expected total payment is E[(X−E(R))2:N +R] = E(X2:N) = Ψo.
Similar arguments hold when p = 1 or T is degenerate.
Proof of Theorem 3.1-G
If a supplier wins the contract, his total cost is X + Cs, and he receives auction
payment, additional windfall R and reimbursed payment Cs as well. From the sup-
plier’s perspective, this is equivalent with the case having cost X and receiving only
auction payment and windfall R. Since the redesign cost Cs is reimbursed anyway, it
should not affect the supplier’s bidding strategy. Therefore, the contract is assigned
to the same supplier with the same auction price as in the case when Cs = 0. From
the buyer’s perspective, in the event of redesign, she has to reimburse the supplier’s
redesign cost Cs and also incurs redesign cost Cb to herself, so the buyer’s expected
total payment is ΨG = E(Cs + Cb) + Ψ, in which Ψ is buyer’s payment analyzed in
Theorem 3.1. We can directly apply the result in Theorem 3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.2-G
This proof covers Theorem 3.2 by assuming Cs = Cb = 0.
The winning supplier spends additional redesign cost Cs and receives additional
payment Cs which cancel out each other. The profit gaining from redesign is moved
up-front, so knowing how severe the error is does not benefit the supplier. Hence,
informed or uninformed suppliers will apply the same bidding strategy. Whoever wins
the auction will get additional payment R̄, so every supplier is willing to lower the
bid by R̄. Therefore, the buyer’ expected total payment is ΨppG = E(Cs + Cb) + R̄ +
E[(X − R̄)2:N ] = E(Cs + Cb) + E(X2:N) = E(Cs + Cb) + Ψo.
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Proof of Theorem 3.3
From the proof of Theorem 3.2-G, we know that knowing how severe the RFQ is
does not benefit an informed supplier. Hence, an informed supplier has no incentive
to hide this information. When the buyer offers an arbitrarily small bounty for
reporting the error, an informed supplier is willing to do so. If the buyer knows the
error beforehand, then she can correct the RFQ and avoid redesign, so the expected
payment is Ψo. There is still a probability (1 − p)N that no supplier can detect the
error. In this case, the buyer has to pay the redesign cost E(Cs + Cb).
Proof of Results when Cs and X are positively correlated
We need to modify the proof of Theorem 3.1-G slightly. When p = 0, p = 1 or
T is degenerate, the contract is given to the supplier with lowest production cost,
hence in the event of redesign, the buyer need to reimburse supplier redesign cost
E[Cs(X1:N , θ)] and the buyer’s expected total payment ΨG = E[Cs(X1:N , θ) + Cb] +
Ψo. For 0 < p < 1 and non-degenerate T , the contract is not necessarily given
to the supplier with lowest production cost, but the expected redesign cost must
be greater than or equal to E[Cs(X1:N , θ)] since E[Cs(x, θ)] increases in x. Hence
ΨG ≥ E[Cs(X1:N , θ) + Cb] + Ψ ≥ E[Cs(X1:N , θ) + Cb] + Ψo.
For Theorem 3.2-G and Theorem 3.3, because of pre-pay, the contract is always
given to the supplier with lowest production cost. The expected supplier redesign
cost is E[Cs(X1:N , θ)].
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CHAPTER 4
Should the Buyer Strategically Exclude the
Incumbent Supplier from the Procurement
Auction?
4.1 Introduction
In summer 2011, the authors interacted with a Tier-1 auto manufacturer. This
manufacturer had signed a contract with one incumbent supplier stating that the
incumbent supplier would reduce the price annually. However, in that year, the
incumbent asked the manufacturer for a higher price than agreed per the contract
clause. The incumbent claimed that they were not able to meet the annual price
reduction target due to increased material cost, increased shipping cost, etc. The
buyer had been working with this incumbent for a few years and had lost track of
the true production cost, so she could not figure out if the supplier was telling the
truth. To resolve this issue, the buyer decided to market-test the price by holding an
online auction with several entrant suppliers. A primary concern of the procurement
manager was whether the incumbent supplier should be invited to the auction or not.
On one hand, the buyer can withhold the incumbent and treat him as an out-
side option. The buyer can set an aggressive reserve price to the competing entrant
suppliers, and get price reduction either through the low reserve price or the entrant
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suppliers’ competition. If no one meets the reserve price, the buyer can go back to
the incumbent supplier. In this way, the buyer can make sure that she gets a better
price than (or at least no worse than) the current incumbent price.
On the other hand, the buyer can invite the incumbent to the auction and drum
up competition with one more bidder. However, by doing so, the buyer is exposed
to the risk of paying more than current incumbent price. When the incumbent is
in the auction, he knows the other bidders’ cost information revealed through the
competition. If all entrant suppliers’ costs turn out to be higher than the current
incumbent price, the incumbent obtains proof that the market price is actually higher
than his current price and will persist in raising the price. This puts the buyer in a
weak position to negotiate with the incumbent supplier.
We investigate the tradeoff between the two alternatives: (a) withholding the
incumbent and use him as an outside option; (b) including the incumbent in the
auction. We introduce the model in §4.2. Section 4.3 analyzes an example with one
incumbent and one entrant. In §4.4, we generalize the results to the N-entrant case
with general cost distributions. We discuss the extensions in §4.5 and conclude the
paper in §4.6. Proofs of results are furnished in §4.7.
4.2 Model Description and Preliminaries
We consider a buyer seeking to allocate a production contract to a single supplier.
We assume the buyer has one incumbent supplier who claims that he cannot do better
than price x̄0. Although the buyer does not know the incumbent’s true minimum
acceptable price, she suspects that it could be lower than the incumbent’s claimed
price x̄0. We use random variable X0 to denote the incumbent’s true minimum
acceptable price, which follows distribution F0 with support [x0, x̄0]. The buyer does
not know how low the incumbent’s true minimal acceptable price compared to the
claimed price. If it is indeed much lower (i.e., X0 = x0 << x̄0), the buyer will lose
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money by simply trusting the incumbent and signing a contract with price x̄0.
In such situations, bringing in the market can be a powerful tool for a buyer. We
model this as the buyer running an open-bid reverse auction, which is a common
mechanism used in practice. The buyer hopes that by reopening the contract for bid
she will get a price below current incumbent price from the auction winner. Suppose
the buyer locates N qualified entrant suppliers. Supplier i’s true minimal acceptable
price Xi follows distribution Fi with support [xi, x̄i]. For simplicity, from now on, we
refer to one supplier’s minimum acceptable price as the supplier’s “cost” although it,
of course, includes a necessary profit margin. Following the logic of Proposition 2.1
in Krishna (2009) and other classic auction literature, if supplier i participates in the
open-bid reverse auction, his dominant bidding strategy is to bid down to his true
cost Xi.
The buyer holds the auction including all entrant suppliers. Whether the incum-
bent supplier also should be invited to the auction is the research question we are
going to analyze. We assume the buyer is risk-neutral and her goal is to minimize
the expected contract payment.
4.2.1 Alternative (a): withhold the incumbent as an outside option
The buyer holds the auction only among the entrants. The incumbent does not
know the existence of the auction, so the buyer can always go back to the incumbent
if the auction fails. In other words, the buyer can view the incumbent as an outside
option and accordingly set a reserve price to truncate the entrants’ prices. If some
entrants are interested, the buyer gives the contract to the winning entrant. If no
entrant meets the reserve price, the buyer transacts with the incumbent supplier at
current incumbent price x̄0.
We use Xk:N to denote the kth lowest value of random variables X1, X2, ..., XN
(whose distributions are not necessarily identical). We use µk:N , xk:N , x̄k:N and Fk:N
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to denote its mean, lower bound, upper bound, and distribution, respectively. The
buyer’s expected contract payment with reserve price r is
EPa(r) = x̄0 ·P (X1:N > r) + r ·P (X1:N < r < X2:N) +E[X2:N |X2:N < r]P (X2:N < r)
(4.1)
The first term on the right hand side is the case when no entrant meets the reserve
price and the buyer has to turn back to the incumbent at price x̄0. The second term is
when only one supplier meets the reserve price and the reserve price sets the auction
price. The third term is when more than one supplier meets the reserve price and
suppliers’ competition decides the auction price.
From Equation (4.1), we observe that the buyer’s payment with alternative (a)
depends on only the entrants’ cost distributions (in fact, only F1:N and F2:N matter)
and the incumbent’s cost upper bound (x̄0) but does not depend on the incumbent’s
cost distribution F0. By excluding the incumbent from the auction, the buyer gives
up the opportunity to explore more about the incumbent’s true cost X0. Instead,
the buyer hopes to strike a good deal with one of the entrant suppliers by using
the incumbent’s current price x̄0 to set an aggressively low reserve price, which is a
credible threat to the entrants since the buyer can always turn back to the incumbent.
Intuitively, the reserve price should not be higher than the outside option cost,
i.e., r ≤ x̄0. Moreover, the reserve price is effective only when it is between X1:N and
X2:N : When r ≤ x1:N , no entrant can meet the reserve price, EPa(r) = x̄0; When
r ≥ x̄2:N , the reserve price never binds, EPa(r) = E[X2:N ]. Therefore, we need to
focus only on r ∈ [x1:N ,min(x̄0, x̄2:N)]. The optimal reserve price is
r∗ = arg min
r∈[x1:N ,min(x̄0,x̄2:N )]
EPa(r).
Later when we discuss the buyer’s payment with alternative (a), we use the buyer’s
99





When the entrants’ cost distributions (in fact, only F1:N and F2:N matter) are
C1-continuous, the function EPa(r) is C
1-continuous on interval [x1:N ,min(x̄0, x̄2:N)].
Therefore, the minimal value should be reached either at one of the endpoints or
where the first order condition is satisfied.
Lemma 4.1. When F1:N and F2:N are C
1-continuous, the optimal reserve price r∗
either equals to x1:N or min(x̄0, x̄2:N), or satisfies the first order condition
dEPa(r)
dr
|r=r∗ = F1:N(r∗)− F2:N(r∗)− (x̄0 − r∗)f1:N(r∗) = 0. (4.2)
We can use this lemma to solve the optimal reserve price for special cost distri-
butions. Furthermore, when entrants’ costs are i.i.d. with distribution F , we can
simplify Equation (4.2) and have the following lemma.
Lemma 4.2. When N entrants are symmetric and the cost distribution F is C1-
continuous with support [x1, x̄1], the optimal reserve price r
∗ either equals to x1 or





4.2.2 Alternative (b): include the incumbent in the auction
Alternatively, the buyer can invite the incumbent to compete with the N entrants,
i.e., holding an open-bid reverse auction among all N + 1 suppliers with no reserve
price. In this way, the buyer gives the incumbent a chance to retain the business. If
the entrants are very competitive and push the auction price low enough, it is possible
that the incumbent will have to bid below the current incumbent price x̄0 in order to
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win the business. However, the buyer also carries a risk: The auction may reveal that
the market price is actually above the current incumbent price, so the incumbent has
more reasons to ask for an even higher price.
One might wonder why the buyer cannot set a reserve price at the current in-
cumbent price. Suppose the buyer sets this reserve price and only the incumbent
meets it, then the incumbent is going to realize that the buyer has no other options
at this price, and will persist in his demands for a price increase — essentially, the
auction has just proved the incumbent’s point that the current price x̄0 is too low.
While one may imagine many ways a price between the incumbent and buyer could be
reached, our approximation is to model the price as the second-best supplier cost in
the auction. This corresponds to the buyer’s next-best alternative to the incumbent,
and we believe this would be a natural price that the incumbent and the buyer would
settle on. By agreeing to market-test the item (i.e., reopen the contract and hold an
auction), the buyer is implicitly putting credibility on the line that the incumbent
is pricing above market, and once this is disproved the buyer is in a much weaker
position to demand a price concession. Therefore, the reserve price x̄0 is not credible
and the buyer gets the same result as if there is no reserve price.
With alternative (b), the contract price is determined by all suppliers’ competition
and thus the buyer’s expected payment depends on all suppliers’ cost distributions.
We use Xk:N+1 to denote the kth lowest value of random variables X0, X1, X2, ..., XN
(whose distributions are not necessarily identical). The buyer’s expected payment is
EPb = E[X2:N+1] (4.4)
4.3 One Incumbent and One Entrant
Whether to exclude or include the incumbent lies in the tradeoff between setting
a reserve price versus bringing more competition. To build a more concrete intuition,
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we analyze the case with one incumbent and one entrant. The entrant is labeled
Supplier 1, whose cost follows uniform distribution with mean µ1 and support length
1, i.e., X1 ∼ U [µ1 − 0.5, µ1 +0.5], x1 = µ1 − 0.5 and x̄1 = µ1 +0.5. The incumbent is
labeled Supplier 0, whose cost follows uniform distribution with mean µ0 and support
length l, i.e., X0 ∼ U [µ0 − 0.5l, µ0 + 0.5l], x0 = µ0 − 0.5l and x̄0 = µ0 + 0.5l. We
define the mean difference ∆µ = µ0 − µ1. We introduce a parameter z = x̄0 − x1 =
∆µ+ 0.5(l + 1), then X1 ∼ x1 + U [0, 1] and X0 ∼ x1 + U [z − l, z].
Alternative (a): withhold the incumbent as an outside option
The buyer employs a reserve price, r, as a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the entrant.
The entrant will accept this offer if it can cover his cost, i.e., X1 ≤ r. Otherwise, the
entrant turns down the offer and the buyer transacts with the incumbent with price
x̄0. The expected payment with reserve price r is
EPa(r) = r · P (X1 ≤ r) + x̄0 · P (X1 > r)
We can prove that the optimal reserve price is
r∗ = x1 +

0 if z ≤ 0
0.5z if 0 < z < 2
1 if z ≥ 2
(4.5)
Consequently, the expected payment with the optimal reserve price is
EPa = x1 +

z if z ≤ 0
z − 0.25z2 if 0 < z < 2
1 if z ≥ 2
(4.6)
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Alternative (b): include the incumbent in the auction
The incumbent and the entrant compete in an open-bid reverse auction. The
auction price is the maximum of the two suppliers’ costs. We can prove that the








if 0 < z < min(l, 1)
0.5 + 1
2l
(z2 − z + 1
3
) if 1 ≤ z ≤ l
0.5 + 1
6l
[z3 − (z − l)3] if l ≤ z ≤ 1
0.5 + 0.5z(z − l) + 1
6l
[(1− z)3 + l3] if max(l, 1) < z < l + 1
z − 0.5l if z ≥ l + 1
(4.7)
4.3.1 How the size of incumbent cost affects the decision
From Equations (4.6) and (4.7), we can see that whether the buyer should withhold
the incumbent as an outside option (alternative: a) or include the incumbent in the
auction (alternative: b) depends on the two parameters, l and z. The interval length
l captures the incumbent’s cost uncertainty since V ar(X0) =
l2
12
, and parameter z
captures the size of the incumbent’s cost since E[X0] = E[X1] + z − 0.5l.
We analyze how the size of incumbent cost affects the buyer’s decision by fixing
l = 1. In this case, the incumbent and the entrant have the same amount of cost
uncertainty but with different cost means. Parameter z = ∆µ+ 0.5(l+ 1) = ∆µ+ 1.
The mean difference ∆µ = µ0 − µ1 shows the size of incumbent cost compared to
the entrant cost: ∆µ < 0 means that the incumbent cost tends to be smaller than
the entrant cost (X0 ≤st X11); ∆µ > 0 means the incumbent cost tends to be larger
1Random variables A ≤st B means A is stochastically smaller than B.
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than the entrant cost (X0 ≥st X1); |∆µ| captures how different the incumbent cost is
compared to the entrant cost.
We compare the buyer’s expected payment with alternative (a) (given in Equa-
tion 4.6) and that with alternative (b) (given in Equation 4.7).
EPb − EPa =

−∆µ− 0.5 if ∆µ ≤ −1
∆µ3
6
+ 0.75∆µ2 − 1
12
if − 1 < ∆µ < 0
−∆µ3
6
+ 0.75∆µ2 − 1
12
if 0 < ∆µ < 1
∆µ− 0.5 if ∆µ ≥ 1
Proposition 4.1. Suppose the incumbent’s cost interval has the same length as that
of the entrant cost, l = 1. When |∆µ| > 0.347, the buyer prefers to withhold the
incumbent as an outside option. When |∆µ| < 0.347, the buyer prefers to invite the
incumbent to compete with the entrant.
This proposition reveals that the buyer wishes to invite the incumbent to compete
with the entrant only when their costs have similar sizes. When the incumbent cost
is either too high or too low compared to the entrant cost, the buyer would rather
exclude the incumbent and treat him as an outside option. This is because when
the incumbent cost is too low, the entrant cost tends to set the auction price which
can even be higher than the current incumbent cost; when the incumbent cost is too
high, including the incumbent to the auction will not intensify the competition much.
In either case, the buyer would rather withhold the incumbent as an outside option.
Only when the incumbent cost and the entrant cost are of similar sizes, is the buyer
more likely to reach the price concession through suppliers’ competition.
4.3.2 How the uncertainty of incumbent cost affects the decision
We now analyze how the uncertainty of incumbent cost affects the buyer’s decision
by fixing ∆µ = 0. In this case, we view the incumbent cost and the entrant cost as
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having the same size since µ1 = µ0. We change the interval length l to see how
the buyer’s decision changes in the incumbent’s cost uncertainty. Larger l indicates




We compare the buyer’s expected payment with alternative (a) (given in Equa-
tion 4.6) and that with alternative (b) (given in Equation 4.7).






















− 0.5 if l ≥ 3
Proposition 4.2. Suppose the incumbent and the entrant have the same mean (i.e.,





3.915), the buyer prefers to withhold the incumbent as an outside option. When
0.6 < l < 3.915, the buyer prefers to invite the incumbent to compete with the entrant.
Auction is a mechanism to reveal cost information. When the incumbent’s cost
uncertainty is very low, there is little room for the buyer to explore the incumbent
cost, and thus, the buyer benefits little by including the incumbent in the competition.
With one incumbent and only one entrant, when the incumbent’s cost range is very
high (l > 3.915), the buyer is worse off by inviting the incumbent to compete with
the entrant, because with only two bidders, the auction price is set by the maximum
of two bidders’ costs. With very high l, the incumbent cost has a bigger chance of
taking a high value, which sets a high auction price. The buyer would rather withhold
the incumbent as outside option and transact with the entrant instead.
4.3.3 When incumbent’s cost upper bound x̄0 is fixed
In the last section, since the mean of the incumbent cost is fixed, as the cost
uncertainty changes, the cost upper bound also changes, which also contributes to
the buyer’s decision between the two alternatives. To remove this factor and focus on
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the cost uncertainty, we now fix the incumbent cost upper bound x̄0 = x̄1, and change
the interval length l. As l increases, the incumbent cost is stochastically smaller and
has higher uncertainty.
In this case, z = 1. We compare the buyer’s expected payment with alternative
(a) (given in Equation 4.6) and that with alternative (b) (given in Equation 4.7).






+ 0.25 if l ≤ 1
1
6l
− 0.25 if l > 1
Proposition 4.3. Suppose the incumbent and the entrant have the same cost upper





(≈ 0.634), the buyer prefers to withhold the
incumbent as an outside option. When l > 0.634, the buyer prefers to invite the
incumbent to compete with the entrant.
As we discuss in §4.2, the buyer’s payment with alternative (a) depends on the
incumbent’s cost upper bound but not the incumbent cost distribution. Therefore,
by fixing the incumbent cost upper bound, the buyer’s payment does not change
even when the interval length changes. On the other hand, with alternative (b), the
auction price is determined by maximal value of the incumbent cost and entrant cost.
When length interval l increases, the incumbent cost is stochastically smaller and
thus the auction price tends to be smaller. Therefore, as l increases, the buyer prefers
more to choose alternative (b): invite the incumbent to compete with the entrant.
4.4 Analysis: N Entrants with General Cost Distributions
Now we consider a more general case withN entrants. Suppliers’ cost distributions
do not have to be uniform and can be any continuous distributions over bounded
intervals. We also allow suppliers’ costs to be asymmetric, i.e., different suppliers can
have different cost distributions. We compare the two alternatives: (a) [withhold the
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incumbent as an outside option] The buyer holds an open-bid reverse auction among
N entrants with an optimally selected reserve price r∗; (b) [include the incumbent in
the auction] The buyer holds an open-bid reverse auction among all N + 1 suppliers
with no reserve price. We want to investigate if the insights we derived in last section
hold in general.
4.4.1 How the size of incumbent cost affects the decision
In the one incumbent and one entrant example, Proposition 4.1 reveals that when
incumbent cost is either relatively low or high (compared to the entrant cost), the
buyer is better off excluding the incumbent rather than inviting him in the auction.
This insight still holds in general case, as shown in the next Theorem.
Theorem 4.1. For any cost distributions F0, F1, ..., FN , if x̄0 ≤ µ1:N or x0 ≥ x̄2:N ,
the buyer prefers to withhold the incumbent as an outside option.
Recall that µ1:N is the mean of the lowest value of X1, X2, ..., XN , and x̄2:N is the
second-lowest upper bound. This theorem gives two threshold points µ1:N and x̄2:N
to show how low and how high the incumbent cost should be so that the buyer will
choose to exclude the incumbent from the auction. For specific distributions, we can
get tighter threshold points.
When the incumbent cost is low, the buyer should not reveal this information
to the incumbent because the incumbent will have more reasons to ask for a higher
price. Therefore, the buyer should not invite the incumbent to the auction, which is
a mechanism to reveal cost information to bidders. The buyer is better off to sign a
contract with the low-cost incumbent, which is equivalent to alternative (a) by setting
a very low reserve price for the entrants.
When the incumbent cost is high, including the incumbent in the auction will not
intensify the competition. Even if the incumbent sees the threat from the entrants,
he cannot lower the price because he needs a price to cover his high cost. However,
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withholding this incumbent will provide the entrants a credible threat and thus get
a better contract price from the entrants (by setting an interior reserve price which
is possible to cut the bid price).
In the other cases when the incumbent cost is in between — not too high, not
too low compared to the entrant cost — the buyer may choose alternative (b) over
alternative (a). The decision depends on the distribution setting.
4.4.2 How the uncertainty of incumbent cost affects the decision
We first analyze the extreme case where the incumbent is telling the truth that
there is indeed no room for him to lower his price, that is, P (X0 = x̄0) = 1.
We can prove that when the buyer knows the incumbent’s exact cost (no matter
how low or how high the incumbent cost is), she always prefers to withhold the
incumbent as an outside option. We formalize this in the following lemma.
Lemma 4.3. For any entrants’ cost distributions F1, F2, ..., FN , if the buyer knows
the incumbent’s exact cost (i.e., V ar(X0) = 0), the buyer prefers to withhold the
incumbent as an outside option.
An auction reveals the bidders’ cost information, so if the buyer already knows
the incumbent’s true cost, there is no need to include the incumbent in the auction.
With alternative (a), if the buyer sets the reserve price just equal to the incumbent
cost, her payment is lower than (or at least no greater than) that with alternative
(b). The buyer can do even better by choosing the optimal reserve price.
Furthermore, we find that when the incumbent cost uncertainty is sufficiently
low, the buyer prefers to withhold the incumbent as an outside option. To remove
the effects of the size of the incumbent cost and focus on the cost uncertainty, we
create a mean-preserve contraction. Suppose for any distribution G, random variable
Y ∼ G with mean µY . Define Yϵ = ϵ(Y − µY ) + µY and its distribution Gϵ is a
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mean-preserve contraction of distribution G.
Theorem 4.2. For any distribution G, there exists ϵG > 0 such that for any ϵ ∈
[0, ϵG], when the incumbent’s cost X0 follows distribution Gϵ, the buyer prefers to
withhold the incumbent as an outside option.
Theorem 4.2 captures Lemma 4.3 by setting ϵ = 0. The reason is similar. Auction
is a mechanism that reveals cost information. When the incumbent cost uncertainty
is low, there is little room for the buyer to explore the incumbent’s true cost through
auction.
Theorems 1 and 2 reveal that the buyer chooses to withhold the incumbent when
the incumbent cost is not comparable to entrant cost and when the incumbent’s cost is
less uncertain. On the other hand, it is possible that the buyer chooses to include the
incumbent in the auction when the incumbent cost is similar in size to the entrant cost
and has a certain amount of uncertainty. We analyze the case when the incumbent
is as competitive as the entrant and has the same amount of uncertainty, i.e., all
suppliers follow the same cost distribution.
Theorem 4.3. [Symmetric Suppliers] When all suppliers’ costs are i.i.d., the
buyer always prefers to hold an auction among all suppliers.
4.4.3 When incumbent’s cost upper bound x̄0 is fixed
When withholding the incumbent, the buyer’s payment depends on the incum-
bent’s cost upper bound (which is the outside option cost) but does not depend on
the incumbent’s cost distribution. Therefore, when the incumbent’s cost upper bound
is fixed and only the distribution changes, the buyer’s payment with alternative (a)
does not change but the payment with alternative (b) does change. We have the
following theorem.
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Theorem 4.4. When the incumbent’s cost upper bound(x̄0) is fixed, as the incum-
bent’s cost distribution F0 becomes stochastically smaller, EPb − EPa is smaller and
thus the buyer prefers more to invite the incumbent to the auction.
As the incumbent cost becomes stochastically smaller, the auction price with
alternative (b) tends to be smaller, so the buyer prefers more to invite the low-cost
incumbent supplier to the auction.
This finding seems to contradict the insights in Section 4.4.1, which indicates
that the buyer prefers to withhold the incumbent if the incumbent cost is very low.
However, in Section 4.4.1, the incumbent cost upper bound is also very low and
the buyer benefits from alternative (a) with a low outside option cost. When the
incumbent’s cost upper bound is fixed, even if the incumbent cost distribution is
stochastically small, the buyer’s payment with alternative (a) is not necessarily low
since it depends on the incumbent’s cost upper bound but not the cost distribution.
4.5 Extension
4.5.1 Alternative (c): withhold the entrants as an outside option
We propose a third alternative: The buyer makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to
the incumbent first; If the incumbent is not interested in this offer, the buyer then
holds an open-bid reverse auction (with no reserve price) among the N entrants. The
auction is held only among the entrants. However, in contrast to alternative (a), the
outside option is not transacting with the incumbent but holding the auction among
the entrants.
The buyer makes the offer r to the incumbent, then the buyer’s expected payment
is
EPc(r) = E[X2:N ]P (X0 > r) + r · P (X0 < r)
The first term on the right hand side is the case when the incumbent rejects the offer
110
and the buyer has to run an auction among the entrants to award the contract. The
second term is when the incumbent accepts the offer, the buyer gives the contract to
the incumbent and does not have to run an auction.
Following similar logic as in §4.2.1, we need to focus only on r ∈ [x0,min(µ2:N , x̄0)].







The advantage of using alternative (c) is that the buyer may save the trouble
of running an auction with the entrants, while with alternative (a) or (b), running
an auction (either among only the entrants or among all suppliers) is inevitable.
However, alternative (c) also brings some practical concern: Since the offer given to
the incumbent is below the expected market price (i.e., r∗ < µ2:N), the incumbent
may view this offer as unfair. As the buyer and the incumbent are currently in
a contract, according to some contract clauses, the buyer may not be allowed to
walk away without showing evidence that the incumbent is indeed pricing above the
market.
For now let us suppose the buyer is very powerful and can use this alternative. We
use some numerical examples to illustrate the tradeoff among the three alternatives.
Example: Suppose there are two entrants whose costs both follow uniform dis-
tribution, Xi ∼ U [5, 6] for i = 1, 2. The incumbent’s cost follows uniform distribution
with mean µ0 and support length l, i.e., X0 ∼ U [µ0 − 0.5l, µ0 + 0.5l]. The mean
difference ∆µ = µ0 − µ1 = µ0 − 5.5.
• How the size of incumbent cost affects the decision
We fix the interval length l and only change the mean difference ∆µ. Figure 4.1
shows how the buyer’s payment changes in the mean difference. We observe: When
the incumbent cost is much lower than the entrant costs, running an auction among all
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(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
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(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
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(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
(c)




















(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
(d)
Figure 4.1: Xi ∼ U [5, 6] for i = 1, 2, X0 ∼ U [µ0 − 0.5l, µ0 +0.5l], ∆µ = µ0 − 5.5. Fix
the length of the incumbent cost interval. Panel (a): l = 0.5; Panel (b):
l = 0.8; Panel (c): l = 1; Panel (d): l = 2.
suppliers is not preferred, because the buyer would rather transact with the incumbent
directly than have the incumbent know (through auction) that he is pricing below
the market price; When the incumbent cost is much higher than the entrant costs,
all three alternatives result in the same expected payment, because a very high-cost
incumbent can neither affect the fair market price nor serve as a credible threat to
push the entrants to further lower the price.
• How the uncertainty of incumbent cost affects the decision
We fix the mean of the incumbent cost and change only the interval length l.
Figure 4.2 shows how the buyer’s payment changes in the cost uncertainty while
the mean is fixed. In Panel (a), the incumbent cost is very low compared to the
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entrant (∆µ = −0.7), so the buyer prefers to directly negotiate with the incumbent
and withhold the entrants as an outside option. In the other panels, we observe:
When the incumbent cost uncertainty is very low, the buyer prefers to withhold the
incumbent as an outside option; When the incumbent has moderate cost uncertainty,
the buyer prefers to include the incumbent in the auction; When the incumbent
cost uncertainty is very high, the buyer prefers to withhold the entrants as an outside
option. This is because when the incumbent and the entrants have similar amounts of
cost uncertainty, the competition reveals the most information and the buyer should
include all suppliers to the auction. If the buyer chooses to withhold the incumbent,
the payment depends only on the incumbent cost upper bound, regardless of the
possibility that the incumbent cost can be low, so alternative (a) is more effective
when the incumbent cost uncertainty is low. If the buyer chooses to withhold the
entrants and sets a reserve price for the incumbent, it is more effective when the
incumbent cost uncertainty is high so that there is more room for the reserve price
to truncate the incumbent price.
• When incumbent’s cost upper bound x̄0 is fixed
We fix the incumbent cost upper bound and change only the interval length l.
Figure 4.2 shows how the buyer’s payment changes in the interval length while the
interval upper bound is fixed. We can see that the buyer’s payment when withholding
the incumbent is constant, because it depends only on the cost upper bound not
the incumbent cost distribution. When the interval length is high, the incumbent
cost has a high chance of taking a small value. In this case, the buyer prefers to
directly negotiate with the incumbent, using entrants as an outside option rather
than including the incumbent in the auction so that the incumbent knows that he is
already pricing below the fair market price.
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(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
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(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
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(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
(c)




















(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
(d)
Figure 4.2: Xi ∼ U [5, 6] for i = 1, 2, X0 ∼ U [µ0 − 0.5l, µ0 + 0.5l], ∆µ = µ0 − 5.5.
Fix the mean of the incumbent cost. Panel (a): ∆µ = −0.7; Panel (b):
∆µ = −0.2; Panel (c): ∆µ = 0; Panel (d): ∆µ = 0.2.










Incumbent cost upper bound=6.0












(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
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Incumbent cost upper bound=7.0












(a) Withhold the incumbent
(b) Auction with all suppliers
(c) Withhold the entrants
(b)
Figure 4.3: Xi ∼ U [5, 6] for i = 1, 2, X0 ∼ U [x̄0 − l, x̄0]. Fix the incumbent cost
upper bound. Panel (a): x̄0 = 6; Panel (b): x̄0 = 7.
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4.5.2 Others approaches: withhold a subset of suppliers
In fact, withholding bidder(s) would be possible whenever there is more than one
supplier. We can think about a more general problem with total M suppliers —
the buyer can withhold some suppliers and run an auction with the rest. There is
no incumbent or entrant in this general model setting, and suppliers are labeled as
supplier 1, 2, ...,M .
We can build such a recursive version: Denote S0 = {1, 2, ...,M}, set k = 1;
The buyer withholds suppliers in Sk ⊂ Sk−1, and runs an auction with suppliers in
Sk−1 \ Sk with reserve price rk; If auction fails, then k = k + 1 and repeat the last
step.
Algorithm for the general case
We use V (S) to denote the minimum expected payment that a buyer can make
with suppliers in set S. We define Xk:T as the kth lowest cost for suppliers in set T .
When T only contains one supplier i, define X2:T = x̄i.
For set S which contains only one supplier i, V (S) = x̄i. When |S| ≥ 2,
V (S) = min
∅≠S′⊂S,r
{E[X2:S], V (S ′)P (r < X1:S\S′)
+ E[min(r,X2:S\S′)|r > X1:S\S′ ]P (r > X1:S\S′)}
We can solve this by backward induction. First solve V (S) for any |S| = 2, then
solve for any |S| = 3, |S| = 4,..., and finally solve V (S0) where S0 = {1, 2, ...,M}.
In this process, we can also record how to reach the minimum value, i.e., what the
optimal reserve prices are and which supplier(s) to withhold.
Algorithm when suppliers’ costs are ordered
Proposition 4.4. If Xi ≥st Xj and x̄i = x̄j, then the buyer prefers to withhold
supplier i rather than supplier j.
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This result allows us to reduce the algorithm complexity if all suppliers have the
same cost upper bound (x̄i = x̄ for any i) and can be ordered X1 ≥st X2 ≥st ... ≥st
XM . We use V (m) to denote the minimum expected payment that a buyer can make
with the first m suppliers. Define V (1) = x̄1.
V (m) = min
0<i<m,r
{E[X2:m], V (i)P (r < X1:{i+1,...,m})
+ E[min(r,X2:{i+1,...,m})|r > X1:{i+1,...,m}]P (r > X1:{i+1,...,m})}
We can solve this by backward induction. First solve V (2), then V (3), V (4),...,
and finally V (M). In this process, we can record how to reach the minimum value,
i.e., what the optimal reserve prices are and which supplier(s) to withhold.
4.6 Conclusions
In this essay, we ask whether a buyer should exclude the incumbent supplier from
the auction and use him as an outside option or invite the incumbent supplier to
compete with other suppliers. On one hand, when withholding the incumbent as an
outside option, the buyer can set an aggressive reserve price for the entrant suppliers
but the auction itself is less fierce with one fewer bidder. On the other hand, when
including the incumbent in the auction, the buyer drums up competition with one
more bidder, but is exposed to the risk of paying more than current incumbent price.
We find that the buyer’s decision depends on the size of the incumbent cost. When
the incumbent cost is expected to be substantially different from the entrants’ (much
lower or much higher), withholding the incumbent supplier is the better choice. This
is because if the incumbent has very low cost, including him in the auction proves the
incumbent is pricing below the market price and the incumbent has more reasons to
persist in raising the price. If the incumbent has very high cost, including him in the
auction will not intensify the competition, so the buyer would rather withhold him
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as an outside option to set a reserve price and push the entrants to lower the price.
The buyer’s decision also depends on the incumbent’s cost uncertainty. An auc-
tion serves as a way to reveal cost information. Therefore, when the incumbent’s cost
uncertainty is very low, there is little room for the auction to take effect in explor-
ing the incumbent cost information, so the buyer will not benefit from inviting the
incumbent to the auction. When the incumbent and the entrants have similar cost
uncertainty (for example, as shown in Theorem 4.3, when all suppliers are symmetric),
an auction among all suppliers is more effective. We also consider another alternative
in Section 4.5.1: withholding the entrants as an outside option. This alternative is
more effective when the incumbent cost uncertainty is high, since there is more room
for the reserve price to truncate the incumbent price.
In this essay, we study approaches that are very natural and would be familiar to
suppliers in practice. Of course, one could imagine other approaches which may also
work in certain circumstances. For example, the buyer could hold an auction with no
reserve price among all entrants; then based on the auction price, the buyer makes
a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the winning entrant; if the winning entrant rejects this
offer, the buyer turns back to the incumbent. This approach works like alternative
(a) but with a more informed reserve price, which makes withholding the incumbent
even more attractive. However, it is questionable whether the buyer can apply this
approach in practice, since the buyer needs to persuade the entrant suppliers to
participate in an auction where the winner may not get the contract. The buyer may
use this approach when the entrant suppliers are very hungry for new business.
Another possible approach is that the buyer could hold an auction among all
entrants with a reserve price equal to the current incumbent price, and then take the
winner of this auction (if there is one) to compete with the incumbent in the second
round auction. This approach would have the same result as alternative (b) with a
reserve price equal to the current incumbent price. The limitation of this approach is
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similar to the former one: It requires the buyer to persuade the entrants to compete
in an initial auction where nothing is awarded before being allowed to compete in
a second auction with a new bidder.We leave the analysis about these alternative
approaches to future work.
4.7 Proofs
Proof of Lemma 4.1
We use fk:N to denote the density function of Xk:N . Recall Equation (4.1),
EPa(r) = x̄0 · P (X1:N > r) + r · P (X1:N < r < X2:N) + E[X2:N |X2:N < r]P (X2:N < r)







= −x̄0 · f1:N(r) + r[f1:N(r)− f2:N(r)] + [F1:N(r)− F2:N(r)] + r · f2:N(r)
= F1:N(r)− F2:N(r)− (x̄0 − r)f1:N(r)
Proof of Lemma 4.2
When X1, X2, ..., XN are i.i.d. with distribution F and density function f , we have
f1:N(r) = Nf(r)(1− F (r))N−1,





|r=r∗ = F1:N(r∗)− F2:N(r∗)− (x̄0 − r∗)f1:N(r∗) = 0
= N(1− F (r∗))N−1(F (r∗)− (x̄0 − r∗)f(r∗))
Since 1− F (r) ̸= 0 and f(r) ̸= 0 when r < x̄1, we have Equation (4.3).
Proof of Equation (4.5), (4.6) and (4.7)
Since X1 ∼ x1 + U [0, 1] and X0 ∼ x1 + U [z − l, z], the optimal reserve price
(r∗) and buyer’s payments (EPa and EPb) with x1 = C equal to those with x1 = 0
plus C, respectively. Therefore, for simplicity, we let x1 = 0, then X1 ∼ U [0, 1] and
X0 ∼ U [z − l, z].
Proof of Equation (4.5): We only need to focus on r ∈ [0, 1]. The payment with
reserve price r ∈ [0, 1] is
EPa(r) = r · P (X1 ≤ r) + z · P (X1 > r) = r2 + z(1− r). (4.8)




= 2r − z ⇐⇒ r = 0.5z.
Therefore, the optimal reserve price is
r∗ =

0 if z ≤ 0
0.5z if 0 < z < 2
1 if z ≥ 2
(4.9)
Proof of Equation (4.6): We replace r in Equation (4.8) with r∗ given in Equa-
tion (4.9).
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Proof of Equation (4.7): For 0 < x < 1, define













The buyer’s payment is
EPb =E[X2:2]
=E[X1]P (X0 < 0) + E[X2:2|0 < X0 < 1]P (0 < X0 < 1)
+ E[X0|X0 > 1]P (X0 > 1)
=0.5





{H[max(min(1, z), 0)]−H[min(max(0, z − l), 1)]}














(H(1)−H(0)) + 0.5(1 + z) z−1
l
if 1 ≤ z ≤ l
1
l
[H(z)−H(z − l)] if l ≤ z ≤ 1
1
l
[H(1)−H(z − l)] + 0.5(1 + z) z−1
l
if max(l, 1) < z < l + 1
0.5(2z − l) if z ≥ l + 1
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Proof of Proposition 4.1
We simplify Equation (4.7) minus Equation (4.6) when l = 1 and z = ∆µ+ 1.
EPb − EPa =

−∆µ− 0.5 if ∆µ ≤ −1
∆µ3
6
+ 0.75∆µ2 − 1
12
if − 1 < ∆µ < 0
−∆µ3
6
+ 0.75∆µ2 − 1
12
if 0 < ∆µ < 1





+ 0.75|∆µ|2 − 1
12
if |∆µ| < 1
|∆µ| − 0.5 > 0 if |∆µ| ≥ 1
We define g(x) = −x3
6
+ 0.75x2 − 1
12
. Function g(x) has three roots x = −0.322,
0.347, 4.475. Hence, g(x) > 0 when x ∈ (0.347, 1), and g(x) < 0 when x ∈ (0, 0.347).
Therefore, EPb−EPa > 0 when |∆µ| > 0.347 and EPb−EPa < 0 when |∆µ| < 0.347.
Proof of Proposition 4.2
We simplify Equation (4.7) minus Equation (4.6) when z = 0.5(l + 1).






















− 0.5 if l ≥ 3






















Function g1(l) has two roots l = 0.6, 3, so g1(l) > 0 when l ∈ (0, 0.6) and g1(l) < 0













> 0 when l ≥ 3 and g3(l) has root l = 3.915. Hence, g3(l) < 0
when 3 ≤ l < 3.915 and g3(l) > 0 when l > 3.915. To summarize, EPb − EPa > 0
when l < 0.6 or l > 3.915, and EPb − EPa < 0 when 0.6 < l < 3.915.
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Proof of Proposition 4.3
We simplify Equation (4.7) minus Equation (4.6) when z = 1.






+ 0.25 if l ≤ 1
1
6l



















< l < 1. Also, 1
6l
− 0.25 < 0 when l > 1. Therefore,











Proof of Theorem 4.1
The second lowest of all N + 1 suppliers’ cost is no less than the lowest of N
entrants’ costs, so X2:N+1 ≥st X1:N and thus EPb = E[X2:N+1] ≥ µ1:N . Since x̄0 is
the outside option cost, EPa ≤ x̄0.
When x̄0 ≤ µ1:N , EPa ≤ x̄0 ≤ µ1:N ≤ EPb.
When x0 ≥ x̄2:N , the incumbent’s cost is no less than the second lowest entrant
cost, so X2:N+1 = X2:N and thus EPb = E[X2:N+1] = µ2:N . Also, EPa ≤ EPa(x0) =
µ2:N . Hence, EPa ≤ EPb.
Proof of Lemma 4.3
For alternative (a), if we set reserve price equaling to the incumbent’s costX0 = x0,
then recall Formula (4.1),
EPa(x0) =x0 · P (X1:N > x0) + x0 · P (X1:N < x0 < X2:N)
+ E[X2:N |X2:N < x0]P (X2:N < x0)
=x0 · P (X2:N > x0) + E[X2:N |X2:N < x0]P (X2:N < x0)
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With alternative (b), the buyer’s payment
EPb =E[X2:N+1]
=E[X1:N |X1:N > x0]P (X1:N > x0) + x0 · P (X1:N < x0 < X2:N)
+ E[X2:N |X2:N < x0]P (X2:N < x0)
≥x0 · P (X2:N > x0) + E[X2:N |X2:N < x0]P (X2:N < x0)
=EPa(x0)
Therefore, EPb ≥ EPa(x0) ≥ EPa.
Proof of Theorem 4.2
If µY > x̄2:N , we can set ϵG = µY − x̄2:N , then for any ϵ ∈ [0, ϵG] and X0 ∼ Gϵ,
x0 = µY − ϵ ≥ x̄2:N . According to Theorem 4.1, EPa ≤ EPb.
Define H(ϵ) = EPb − EPa. When all random variables are continuous, H(ϵ)
is continuous. If we can prove H(0) > 0 when µY ≤ x̄2:N , then according to the
definition of continuous function, such ϵG exists and the proof is complete.
We considerX0 ∼ G0 (i.e., P (X0 = µY ) = 1). When µY ≤ x̄2:N , dEPa(r)dr |r=µY − < 0.
Hence EPa < EPa(µY ) ≤ EPb.
Proof of Theorem 4.3
The optimal mechanism with symmetric suppliers is to hold an open-bid reverse
auction among all suppliers. The optimal mechanism dominates other mechanisms
including alternative (a).
Proof of Theorem 4.4
Buyer’s payment with alternative (a) EPa does not change. As X0 becomes
stochastically smaller, X2:N+1 becomes stochastically smaller, so the buyer’s payment
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with alternative (b) EPb = E[X2:N+1] is smaller. The proof is complete.
Proof of Proposition 4.4
When x̄i = x̄j, withholding supplier i and withholding supplier j have the same
outside option cost. However, since Xi ≤st Xj, the auction price when withholding
supplier j (supplier i participates in the auction) is stochastically smaller than that





This dissertation research consists of three essays examining different aspects in
competitive bid procurement.
The first essay explores the value of cost modeling in competitive bid procurement,
to understand if, how and when cost modeling should be deployed. The answer is
not obvious, since the bidding competition itself acts as a tool to discover suppliers’
cost information — suppliers may have to bid close to their minimum acceptable
price in order to win. I show that although bid competition sometimes duplicates the
information gleaned by cost modeling, the latter can still be beneficial when it helps
the buyer set an effective reserve price. Then I analyze how the buyer can gain the
most benefit through cost modeling. Specifically, I characterize which supplier(s) to
learn about, which portion(s) of the costs to learn, and how deeply and broadly the
buyer should learn for general supply base topologies.
Many requests for quotes (RFQs) issued by firms can be flawed due to errors of
omission and misspecification, which triggers redesign and associated supplier windfall
profit. The second essay studies the problem of error-prone RFQ. Surprisingly, I find
that RFQ error encourages suppliers to submit lower bids with anticipation of future
windfall profit due to redesign. I also find that supplier disparity in error-detecting
expertise generally hurts the buyer. Furthermore, I propose a creative approach, “pre-
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pay”, to stem supplier windfall profit; under this new mechanism, the buyer can offer
a small bounty to induce knowledgeable suppliers to divulge the existence of RFQ
error. This pre-pay and error-bounty approach helps avoiding the cost of redesign,
creates a win-win solution for both parties, and makes the entire supply chain more
efficient.
In the third essay, I analyze a buyer firm’s decision about whether to invite an
incumbent supplier to compete with entrant suppliers. On one hand, when excluding
the incumbent from auction and use him as an outside option, the buyer can set
an aggressive reserve price to truncate the entrants’ prices but the auction is less
fierce with one fewer bidder; On the other hand, when including the incumbent in
the auction, the buyer drums up competition with one more bidder but is exposed to
the risk of paying more than current incumbent price. I find that the buyer’s decision
depends on the incumbent’s and entrants’ cost distributions: When the incumbent’s
cost is expected to be substantially different from the entrants’ (either much lower
or much higher) and has low uncertainty, withholding the incumbent supplier is the
better option; Conversely, when the incumbent’s cost is comparable to the entrants’
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